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INTRODUCTION
At age 18, over pinball and pickup basketball games, Abdullahi Yusuf
was first introduced to ISIS propaganda via YouTube videos.1 ISIS served
as a solution to the teen’s alienation.2 Yusuf was drawn to the allure of

1. See Brendan I. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist Back into a Citizen, WIRED (Jan.
24,
2017)
[hereinafter
Koerner,
Can
You
Turn
a
Terrorist],
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/can-you-turn-terrorist-back-into-citizen/
[https://perma.cc/QC7A-JFJ6].
2. See id.; see also Joanna Walters, An Incredible Transformation: How Rehab, Not
Prison, Worked for a US ISIS Convert, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2018),
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extremist beliefs, that one organization could solve his problems.3 A few
months later, he left for the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport to
board a flight to Syria.4 Yusuf was attempting to join ISIS.5 Instead, he was
arrested and charged with providing material support to a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO).6
But Yusuf was granted an opportunity most other material support
defendants are not: participation in a rehabilitation program structured by his
judge, the U.S. Attorney’s office, and a world-renowned expert on
deradicalization.7 The expert, Daniel Koehler, believes that giving people
an opportunity to change is core to living in “a democratic, pluralistic
society.”8 Yusuf’s successful completion of the program meant he would
not
spend
the
next
decade
or
two
behind
bars.9
“Young people,” defined as those under 25,10 make up the majority of the
U.S. population charged with the federal crime of providing material support
to an FTO.11 Material support statutes are the principal means of confronting

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/04/american-isis-abdullahi-yousuf-rehabilat
ation [https://perma.cc/PM8J-U7DT].
3. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; Rachel Martin, Radicalization
Recipe: Why Young People Are Drawn to ISIS, NPR (June 5, 2016, 7:48 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/06/05/480820177/radicalization-recipe-why-young-people-are-dr
awn-to-isis [https://perma.cc/69YF-8NEN].
4. See, e.g., Mukhtar M. Ibrahim, ISIS Trial in Minnesota: What You Need to Know,
MPR
NEWS
(May
6,
2016),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/05/06/isis-trial-minnesota-faq
[https://perma.cc/R5V6-92LJ]; Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; Martin,
supra note 3.
5. See Ibrahim, supra note 4; Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
6. See Ibrahim, supra note 4.
7. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; see also Dina Temple-Raston,
He Was Caught Trying to Join ISIS, Now He’s in Jihadi Rehab, NPR (May 16, 2016, 4:55
PM)
[hereinafter
Temple-Raston,
He
Was
Caught],
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/16/478257287/he-was-caught-trying-to-joinisis-now-hes-in-jihadi-rehab [https://perma.cc/93QZ-6TE6] (explaining the principles and
strategies that Koehler uses to run the German Institute on Radicalization and
De-Radicalization Studies).
8. See Martin, supra note 3.
9. See Walters, supra note 2.
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See CTR. ON NAT’L. SEC. AT FORDHAM L., THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION: TERRORISM
PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES — THE ISIS CASES 3, 11–12, 28 (2017) [hereinafter
AMERICAN
EXCEPTION],
https://news.law.fordham.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/TheAmericanException9-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5LW-Z9NX]. “Eighty percent . . . were indicted on material support
charges.” CTR. ON NAT’L. SEC. AT FORDHAM L., CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: MARCH 1, 2014 – JUNE 30, 2016, at 2 (2016) [hereinafter CASE BY CASE ISIS
PROSECUTIONS],
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/577c5b43197aea832bd4
86c0/1467767622315/ISIS+Report+-+Case+by+Case+-+July2016.pdf
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would-be terrorists, including those in the early stages of indoctrination12 —
the material support statutes are deliberately broad to facilitate arrests before
any violence occurs.13 Material support conduct includes actions such as
donating funds, communicating online, and intending to move abroad to join
an FTO.14 Although most material support offenders can receive up to a
statutory maximum sentence of 20 years, most receive a lesser sentence.15
When a defendant is offered and has completed a tailored alternative to
incarceration program, judges are generally more likely to opt for a sentence
below the maximum.16 Such a program may also help the public feel safer
once a material support defendant returns home. The only such diversion
program specifically created for young persons charged with material
support was in Minneapolis, Minnesota, through the District of Minnesota.17
In 2016, the Minneapolis program aimed to rehabilitate a young person
charged with material support to ISIS.18 Yusuf, who was 18 at the time of
his arrest, pursued a path of re-pluralization as opposed to a possible
double-digit long prison sentence.19 “Re-pluralization,” a term coined by
German radicalization expert Daniel Koehler,20 is “the careful reintroduction
of problems and solutions into a radicalized person’s life, so that they can
[choose to] no longer devote all their mental energy to stewing over
[extremist thinking].”21 “Through positive and supportive personal

[https://perma.cc/WT5W-GKT2]. For information on FTOs, see infra note 28 and
accompanying text.
12. See Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself? Sentencing Young American Muslims
in the War on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1539–40 (2017).
13. See id. at 1540.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B.
15. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 13; Quick Facts: Offenses Involving
National
Defense,
U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N
(2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/National_
Defense_FY17.pdf [https://perma.cc/939W-CGEG]. In 2017, the average sentence for
providing material support to an FTO was 157 months. See id.
16. See Roberto Cordeiro & Arthur Penny, Alternatives to Incarceration in New York
Eastern and Southern Districts, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., MALCOLM WIENER CTR. FOR SOC.
POL’Y
(May
10,
2016),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/wiener/programs/criminaljustice/research-publications/
young-adult-justice/developments-in-young-adult-justice/alternatives-to-incarceration-in-ne
w-york-eastern-and-southern-districts
[https://perma.cc/B8KN-82UH].
For
further
information about various alternative to incarceration programs, see infra Section I.E.
17. See Kelly A. Berkell, Off-Ramp Opportunities in Material Support Cases, 8 HARV. J.
NAT’L SEC. 1, 47–48 (2017).
18. See id.
19. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
20. See id.; Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7 (explaining how Koehler runs
the German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies).
21. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1. For more information on
re-pluralization, see infra Section IV.B.i.
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relationships, mentoring, capacity building, [and] education,” Yusuf chose
to understand that no one organization can solve his problems.22
Re-pluralization education teaches that decisions need not be binary, that
much of life is made out of the gray, not the stark black and white. That
teenager is now 23 years old and leading a successful life in Minneapolis.23
No matter where on the radicalization spectrum the defendant is, it is best
for the broader community if the defendant has an opportunity to
deradicalize.
Although Yusuf is the first and, so far, the only graduate of the 2016
Minneapolis program,24 the program’s monumental goals warrant
emulation. The Minneapolis program’s success should serve as inspiration
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, where nearly 20% of all
ISIS-related cases are prosecuted.25 This means that two of the nation’s 94
federal district courts hear nearly one out of every five ISIS-connected
cases.26 Thus, the Southern District of New York (SDNY) and the Eastern
District of New York (EDNY), separated by a ten-minute subway ride,
should consider implementing their own material support diversion program
— either pre-trial or post-sentencing.
This Note argues that a tailored diversion program for young people
charged with material support will combat excessively harsh sentences and
do more to prevent terror than incapacitation prevents.27 The enactment of

22. Daniel Koehler, Violent Radicalization Revisited: A Practice-Oriented Model, INT’L
RELS.
&
SEC.
NETWORK
(June
26,
2015),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/192640/ISN_191575_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ9N-7XSX].
23. See Hollie McKay, How Minneapolis’ Somali Community Became the Terrorist
Recruitment
Capital
of
the
US,
FOX
NEWS
(Feb.
16,
2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/how-rep-ilhan-omars-minnesota-district-became-the-terrorist-r
ecruitment-capital-of-the-us-officials-highly-concerned
[https://perma.cc/XGV2-GUM2]
(explaining how “Yusuf’s ‘transformation’ has been nothing short of ‘successful’ and one that
could be adapted to others going down a dangerous road to radicalization”).
24. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 47.
25. See ISIS in America: The Cases, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, GEO. WASH. [hereinafter
ISIS in America], https://extremism.gwu.edu/cases [https://perma.cc/HXT7-LS2D] (last
visited Sept. 22, 2020). Of the 209 ISIS-connected cases in the United States, 37 cases are in
EDNY and SDNY. Therefore, 17.70% of ISIS-connected cases are prosecuted in EDNY or
SDNY. This is the number for all ISIS-connected cases, not for solely material support cases.
The Author reviewed all 209 cases to note which were prosecuted in EDNY and SDNY.
AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 12, 28. Eighty percent were indicted on material
support charges. CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 2.
26. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3, 12, 28; Court Role & Structure, U.S.
CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure
[https://perma.cc/859P-TSBW] (last visited Oct. 21, 2020).
27. Incapacitation refers to incarceration; people who are incarcerated are incapacitated
from society. “Incapacitation reduces crime by literally preventing someone from committing
crime [outside of prison,] through direct control during the incarceration experience . . . .”
Shawn D. Bushway, Incapacitation, 4 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 37, 37 (2017).
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a diversion program for young material support defendants in SDNY and
EDNY would be a first step towards rehabilitating individuals and
preventing further radicalization. Part I explains the material support statutes
and how the terrorism enhancement applies under federal sentencing
guidelines. Part I also describes the number and types of prosecutions for
terrorism-related charges, the various costs of long-term imprisonment, and
the status of current diversion programs in the federal system and in SDNY
and EDNY. Part II questions what is in the nation’s best interest: long terms
of incarceration rooted in specific deterrence or rehabilitation for vulnerable
young people who might further radicalize in prison? Part II also explains
how the attenuated material support statutes, coupled with the terrorism
enhancement, impact young defendants and considers why young people
should be sentenced differently than adults. Part III examines the outcomes
of the District of Minnesota’s terrorism diversion program and of other
countries’ terrorism diversion programs. Part III also explains some of the
pitfalls of diversion programs in general and the specific concerns of relevant
stakeholders most interested in seeing the program succeed. Part IV
contends that for EDNY and SDNY to successfully rehabilitate people
convicted of material support, it is most effective to provide these defendants
with a structured program focused on re-pluralization, which includes
family, community, choice, and the ability to make mistakes.
I. WHO ARE MATERIAL SUPPORT DEFENDANTS AND HOW ARE THEY
SENTENCED?
A. The Material Support Crime
Material support is typically prosecuted under two federal criminal
statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A for providing material support to terrorists and
18 U.S.C. § 2339B for providing material support or resources to designated
FTOs.28

28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B; see also Berkell, supra note 17, at 21 (explaining how “[t]wo
related but less frequently employed statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339C and 2339D, prohibit
fundraising for terrorism and receiving military-type training from a designated FTO,
respectively. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339 criminalizes the act of harboring or concealing a
terrorist”) (citations omitted). Furthermore, an FTO is designated by the Secretary of State if
she has determined that:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title) or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of Title
22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism;
and
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The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the impetus for the first
material support statute.29 It was amended in 1996 after the Oklahoma City
bombings.30 The September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attacks led to
further amendments through the Patriot Act.31 In the statutes’ first six years,
from 1994 to 2000, there were only six material support cases.32 By contrast,
92 material support cases were brought in the three years following
September 11.33 After September 11, material support became the Justice
Department’s most frequent anti-terror charge.34 Convictions under the
material support statutes “require no proof that the defendant engaged in
terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, or conspired to commit terrorism.”35
Therefore, “what makes the law attractive to prosecutors — its sweeping
ambit — is precisely what makes it so dangerous to civil liberties.”36
18 U.S.C. § 2339A defines “material support” as:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation
. . . .37
Material support violation sentences range from time served to the 20-years
maximum.38

(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of
United States nationals or the national security of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1189.
29. See Nicole Hong, ‘Material Support’ Statute Is Front and Center in Antiterror Push,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
27,
2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/material-support-statute-is-front-and-center-in-antiterror-push1432719002 [https://perma.cc/N9U5-GD82].
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See DAVID D. COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 165 (2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
38. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28. “Violations of Section 2339A are
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years; violations of Section 2339B by
imprisonment for not more than 20 years.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41333,
TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339A AND § 2339B (2016).
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A wide range of conduct constitutes material support. Everything from
raising $300 for Al Shabab39 to boarding a plane with the intent to find and
join ISIS abroad to helping prepare an attack on U.S. soil with those who
will execute it.40 The statutes were written with the intent of broad use, and
the government has prosecuted individuals under this extensive scope.
Professor Sameer Ahmed explains: “As part of the War on Terror, the
government adopted a strategy of proactively preventing terrorist attacks
before they take place and incapacitating any individual who supports
terrorist organizations.”41 In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the thenAttorney General John Ashcroft instructed the Department of Justice to
“prevent first, prosecute second.”42 In 2006, then-Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales held a press conference where he explained, “homegrown terrorists
may prove to be as dangerous as groups like Al Qaeda. Our philosophy here
is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we don’t
know what we don’t know about a terrorism plot.”43 Thus, the material
support statutes’ utility is in their breadth, without which the government
would not have as much power to cast the widest net possible.

39. See CTR. ON L. & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 – SEPTEMBER 11, 2011, at 7, 20 (2011) [hereinafter TERRORIST TRIAL
REPORT
CARD],
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/TTRC-Ten-Year-Issue.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8MRU-8MR8]. “Al-Shabab, or ‘the Youth,’ is an Islamist insurgent group
based in Somalia.” Al-Shabab has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization since
2008. “Al-Shabab’s leadership declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012.” Al-Shabab, COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab
[https://perma.cc/54AL-E7VZ] (last visited July 17, 2020).
40. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28. For example, “Jaelyn Young was
sentenced to 12 years in prison for attempting to depart the U.S. and join ISIS in Syria.
Although [Young] envisioned a nonviolent role for herself, she understood that ISIS was a . .
. terrorist organization when she attempted to board a flight to leave the United States with
the express goal of providing her services to ISIS.” Divergently, a jury convicted Abdul Malik
Abdul Kareem “for violating the material support statute when he helped Elton Simpson and
Nadir Soofi prepare for their attack in Garland, Texas, on behalf of ISIS.” Id. He was
sentenced to 30 years in prison. See Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem Update: US Judge Calls for
Retrial
of
1
Count
in
Texas
Attack,
ABC15 (Dec.
27,
2019),
https://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/abdul-malik-abdul-kar
eem-update-us-judge-calls-for-retrial-of-1-count-in-texas-attack#:~:text=PHOENIX%20%E
2%80%94%20A%20U.S.%20judge%20refused,Judge%20Susan%20R
[https://perma.cc/3CQU-NZWU]. Kareem is currently appealing his case and may be
awarded a new trial. See id.
41. Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1525.
42. Id. (quoting Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 9 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States)).
43. Eric Umansky, Department of Pre-Crime, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2008),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/02/department-pre-crime/
[https://perma.cc/3PH4-PBJA].
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B. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Terrorism Enhancement
Nearly all terrorism suspects are tried in Article III courts.44 Article III
judges have broad discretion in sentencing.45 This is especially true after the
2005 Booker v. United States decision, in which the Supreme Court granted
district courts broad discretion to impose sentences in an effort to create a
sentencing scheme that complies with the Sixth Amendment.46 Judges must
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including “the history
and characteristics of the defendant,” “the kinds of sentences available,” and
“the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct.”47 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines determine the guidelines

44. See George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission,
the Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 517 (2014).
45. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of
Sentencing, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
46. See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (holding that the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and allowing the Court to exercise its discretion in
sentencing).
47. A court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, after
considering the following factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines— . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy
statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued
under section 994(p) of title 2); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced.
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range for a person charged with a federal crime.48 Unless there is a
mandatory minimum or maximum, an Article III judge can choose to
sentence the defendant within, above, or below the guidelines.49 Judges must
consider the guidelines set out in a table, which has two parts: (1) the offense
level and (2) prior criminal history category.50 The seriousness of the alleged
conduct, as well as other factors, determines the offense level.51 Once the
judge determines the offense level and criminal history category, the judge
will look at the chart and find the applicable sentencing range, which is given
in months.52
Certain felonies are grouped into sentencing enhancements, which add
time to a defendant’s base guidelines range.53 Material support sentences are
capped at 240 months (or life imprisonment, if the death of any person
results).54 But if a material support defendant is charged with an additional

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “A district court may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is
reasonable; it must instead conduct its own independent review of the sentencing factors,
aided by the arguments of the prosecution and defense.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d
180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). The district court may depart from the Guidelines range
when it “consider[s] all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by a party.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).
48. See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
49. See id. at ch. 5.
50. See id. at ch. 5, pt. A.
DEFS.
N.Y.,
51. See
Federal
Sentencing,
FED.
https://federaldefendersny.org/information-for-client-and-families/federal-sentencing.html
[https://perma.cc/r6n6-72z4] (last visited June 9, 2020) (explaining how, “[f]or example,
murder is at the top of the chart, at level 43. Theft of a small amount of money is closer to the
bottom of the chart, at level 6”). “For example, the offense level will usually decrease with
‘acceptance of responsibility,’ which is most often demonstrated by pleading guilty. The
criminal history category is calculated by giving ‘points’ to each prior conviction.” Id.; see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at ch. 4, pt. A.
A more serious prior conviction will receive more points. A less serious [one] will
receive fewer points, or no points at all. Older convictions will not be counted if
they happened more than fifteen years ago for the more serious convictions, or ten
years ago for the less serious convictions.
Federal Sentencing, supra note 51.
52. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at ch. 5, pt. A.
53. See id. at ch. 3. Examples of other types of enhancements include hate crime
motivation, serious human rights offense, and using a minor to commit a crime. See id.
54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B. Violating §§ 2339A or 2339B subjects someone to a
maximum prison term of 15 or 20 years for each count respectively. See also AMERICAN
EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 28.
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crime, the terrorism enhancement often leads to a sentence above 20 years;
this enhancement is a major contributor to material support sentences above
20 years.55 The terrorism enhancement requirement is satisfied if the offense
is felonious conduct that (1) involved a crime of terrorism, or (2) was
intended to promote a crime of terrorism.56 The terrorism enhancement only
refers to a “federal crime of terrorism” — it does not provide a specific list
of criminal offenses.57 The federal crime of terrorism “statute lists over fifty
crimes and requires that a qualifying offense be ‘calculated to influence or
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate
against government conduct.’”58
Section 3A1.4 of the Guidelines inflates a defendant’s criminal history to
a category VI, the harshest possible category, even when that defendant has
no prior criminal record.59 Section 3A1.4 has a dramatic impact on sentences
by increasing both factors in the sentencing calculus: a defendant’s offense
level and criminal history score.60 This means the criminal history score can
be completely artificial if a defendant has not committed any prior crimes.
Unsurprisingly, apart from Section 3A1.4, the other Guidelines provisions
that automatically raise a defendant’s criminal history beyond the properly
calculated criminal history score involve defendants with aggravated prior
criminal convictions.61 The Guidelines authorize a judge to sentence a
defendant lower than the recommended Guidelines when “reliable
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category

55. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4 (stating acts of
international or domestic felony terrorism are eligible for a terrorism enhancement); Ahmed,
supra note 12, at 1528 (explaining “[o]f all the adjustments in the Guidelines, the Terrorism
Enhancement is the most severe. As an example, the Enhancement can lead to a sentence from
thirty years to life for a crime that would otherwise result in a sentence of around five years”).
56. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4. One of the enumerated
statutes is providing material support to a terrorist organization under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A
and 2339B. See id. (application note 2).
57. See Brown, supra note 44, at 533.
58. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)).
59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 3A1.4(b).
60. See James P. McLoughlin Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines
Section 3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, 28 LAW & INEQ. 51, 53 (2010).
61. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 4B1.1(b) (automatic assignment
to criminal history category VI for career offenders who have prior convictions for drug
trafficking or crimes of violence); id. § 4B1.4(c)(2)–(3) (automatic assignment to criminal
history category IV or VI for defendant sentenced under Armed Career Criminal Act due to
prior conviction for violent felony or serious drug offense); id. § 4B1.5(a)(2) (automatic
assignment to criminal history category V for certain sex crime defendants with prior sex
offense convictions involving minors).
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substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.”62
For example, in United States v. Ceasar,63 Amera Ceasar was charged
with material support to ISIS for serving as an online ISIS facilitator through
Facebook and other social media platforms.64 She was also charged with
obstruction of justice after re-connecting with ISIS members online while
released on bond.65 Although her material support charge was capped at a
20-year sentence, the government chose to advocate for a 30- to 50-year
sentence based on her obstruction of justice charge and the terrorism
enhancement’s boost.66 Since the terrorism enhancement increases a
defendant’s criminal history to a category VI,67 and she received multiple
additions to her offense level, it was within the Sentencing Guidelines for
Ceasar, who had no criminal history, to receive up to 50 years in prison.68
In another case where the defendant was convicted of both material
support and obstruction of justice, Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi
explained how the two charges, when intersected with the terrorism
enhancement, create a warped effect:
It is ironical — more than ironical, potentially dangerous — that the
government was able to take what is already a very serious crime —
attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization —
and, on the basis of some not overly strong facts, bring an obstruction
charge that more than doubled the maximum sentence otherwise
available. . . . And the additional term of 20 years of imprisonment seems
incongruous. Obstruction of justice can, of course, in some circumstances,
be a very serious crime. But we have to look at the context. And here, in
this specific context, the record does not establish the seriousness of that
crime. Indeed, it looks as though the court imposed the sentence it did
based on the heinousness of Defendant’s attempted terrorism and simply
used the obstruction conviction as a means to go beyond the statutory
maximum of that terrorism count.69

62. Id. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
63. 388 F. Supp. 3d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
64. See id. at 200.
65. See id. at 203.
66. See id. at 223.
67. See McLoughlin Jr., supra note 60, at 54.
68. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. at 218, 223.
69. United States v. Pugh, 937 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 2019) (Calabresi, J., concurring). It
is worth noting that on December 10, 2019, the Second Circuit, in Pugh II, held that there was
an additional procedural error because of the district court’s inadequate statement of reasons
and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Pugh (Pugh II), 945 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2019).
The Second Circuit emphasized that “the district court must impose a sentence that is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 28. And
“if the court determines that a lower sentence will be just as effective as a higher sentence, it
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The distorted effect illustrates how the terrorism enhancement can more
than double a defendant’s sentence when a second, non-maximum sentence
charge is added — even though Congress intended a 20-year maximum
sentence for non-violent material support offenders.70 This means a
defendant can receive a life sentence for a crime with a 20-year maximum.
This warped, sentence-lengthening impact is an example of how the
terrorism enhancement is used to aggrandize a sentence without considering
further individualized factors, such as criminal history or specific deterrence.
C. Numbers and Types of Terrorism-Connected Prosecutions
Between September 11, 2001, and February 2018, federal courts
convicted over “660 individuals on terrorism-related charges.”71 These
convictions include both domestic acts of terror as well as criminal conduct
tied to international terrorism.72 Since the first ISIS arrests in March 2014,
37 out of 209 ISIS-connected charges were prosecuted in the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York.73 Ten were prosecuted in SDNY, and 27
were prosecuted in EDNY.74 This is nearly 18% of all ISIS charges in the
United States.75 In fact, “since the September 11th attacks, E.D.N.Y . . . .
has become an aggressive prosecutor of terrorism, securing more convictions
than any other U.S. Attorney’s office.”76 Cases charged in EDNY and

must choose the lower sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). Judge Calabresi issued a similar
opinion in his concurrence, warning of the extreme use of obstruction of justice charges. See
id. at 28–30 (Calebresis, J., concurring); see also Darrell Fields, Wednesday, December 11th
2019,
FED.
DEFS.
N.Y.
BLOG
(Dec.
11,
2019),
https://blog.federaldefendersny.org/the-second-circuit-issues-an-amended-opinion-in-united
-states-v-pugh-no-17-1889-cr-__f-3d__-2019-wl-6708812-dec-10-2019-pugh-ii-a-material-s
upport-to-terrorism-case-a/ [https://perma.cc/HS2C-9S28].
70. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 1, 2.
71. Myth v. Fact: Trying Terror Suspects in Federal Courts, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Feb. 14,
2018),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/myth-v-fact-trying-terror-suspects-federal-courts
[https://perma.cc/862C-HTHT] (comparing convictions in federal civilian courts to those in
military commissions which “have convicted only eight [terrorism-related cases], three of
which have been overturned completely and one partially”).
72. See id. (elaborating on how “[f]ederal court convictions include those resulting from
investigations of terrorist acts and of criminal acts by those with an identified link to
international terrorism. Federal courts have convicted many high-profile terrorists, including
‘Shoe Bomber’ Richard Reid [in 2002], Ramzi Yousef (1993 World Trade Center bombing),
Faisal Shahzad (Times Square bomber [in 2010]), and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith (Osama bin
Laden’s son-in-law . . . in March 2014[)]”).
73. See ISIS in America, supra note 25.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. William Finnegan, Taking Down Terrorists in Court, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/taking-down-terrorists-in-court
[https://perma.cc/D3L3-XUMU].
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SDNY “feature a diverse mix of [prosecutions], including foreign fighters,
facilitators, domestic plotters, assailants, and hybrid cases combining foreign
and domestic objectives.”77
Material support has become the most frequently charged terrorism
offense since September 11, 2001.78 According to New York University’s
Center on Law and Security’s analysis of jihadist-inspired terrorism cases,
the government alleged material support in 11.6% of cases in 2007; that
measure rose to 69.4% by 2010.79 There were 65 charges of § 2339B
material support — over four times any other terrorism charge.80 The
second-most common charge was § 2339A material support with 14
charges,81 and the third was 18 U.S.C. § 1001 charges of false statements
with 11 charges.82
Approximately 77% of individuals charged in ISIS-related cases are U.S.
citizens,83 and nearly all defendants in ISIS-connected cases identify as
Muslim.84 “By contrast, 58% of all federal criminal defendants are U.S.
citizens.”85 Notably, 72% of defendants had no criminal history at all, and
89% of cases involved social media86 — it is therefore not surprising that
most people charged with ISIS-related cases are young.87 In fact, 20 was
“the most prevalent age” and a majority of defendants were aged 25 years or
younger. 88

77. AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 10.
78. See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUM. RTS. FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 32 (2008),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZJL-6AU5].
79. TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at 19.
80. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 13.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 3.
84. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 3.
85. Id.
86. CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 26, 27.
87. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 11 (“While the average age for all
ISIS-related cases is 27.2, the most prevalent age is much lower, at 20. The median age is
25.5 years old. In the aggregate, the ISIS cases skew heavily toward the earlier stages of
adulthood, with more than half the cases involving individuals who are 25 or younger at the
time of arrest. Nevertheless, 47% of the individuals are older than 25, and the most destructive
domestic attacks were perpetrated by assailants near 30 years of age. Only a third of
individuals in ISIS cases in the United States are 30 years of age or older.”); Social Media
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(June
12,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/
[https://perma.cc/RNB3-9TW3]. Ninety percent of people aged 18 to 29 use social media. Id.
88. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 11.
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D. Monetary Costs of Imprisonment
The United States incarcerates more people than any other country in the
world,89 spending “more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3
million people behind bars.”90 The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
currently incarcerates 184,000 individuals, and in Fiscal Year 2019, their
budget exceeded $7 billion.91 In 2018, the average cost of a person detained
in federal prison was $36,299.25 ($99.45 per day).92 If a person is sent to
solitary confinement, that annual rate can more than double to $75,000 per
year.93
Furthermore, the United States spends over $100 billion on
counterterrorism each year.94 This $100 billion is spent on military
expenditures, investigations, local police force trainings, prosecutions, and
diplomatic efforts.95 The funding for anti-terrorism and prison is
astronomical; diversion programs cost a fraction of either the counter-terror
or BOP budgets and could appropriately come from either, or both, funding
streams.
E. The Current State of Diversion Programs in the Federal Court
System Generally, and in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York Specifically
Diversion programs, alternative to incarceration programs, and off-ramp
solutions generally refer to the same concept: providing a
rehabilitation-focused program for people charged or convicted with a

89. See
World
Prison
Populations,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm
[https://perma.cc/GJ26-ZV9P] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020) (explaining how “[p]rison rates in
the U.S. are the world’s highest, at 724 . . . per 100,000” people).
90. See Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Dec.
17,
2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/7BTV-HJE3].
91. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2019 PERFORMANCE BUDGET
CONGRESSIONAL
SUBMISSION
SALARIES
AND
EXPENSES
1
(2019),
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1034421/download [https://perma.cc/7AWS-J7CR].
92. See Teo Spengler, How Much Do Prisons Cost Taxpayers?, GO BANKING RATES (July
9,
2020),
https://www.gobankingrates.com/taxes/filing/wont-believe-much-prison-inmates-costing-ye
ar/ [https://perma.cc/CLG2-3V7M].
93. See id.
94. See Jeanne Sahadi, The Cost of Fighting Terrorism, CNN (Nov. 16, 2015, 6:29 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/11/16/news/economy/cost-of-fighting-terrorism/index.html
[https://perma.cc/YJP3-D2X3].
95. See id.
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criminal offense.96 Diversion programs aim to improve public safety and
curtail recidivism “by targeting the underlying problems that led to the
criminal act.”97 Generally, these programs, for both state and federal courts,
aim to divert people to community–based solutions with the ultimate goals
of reducing crime, limiting jail time, and eliminating the many collateral
consequences of involvement with the criminal legal system.98 Diversion
programs can be mandated in lieu of prison time, or in addition to prison time
with the sentence possibly shortened due to participation in the program.99
They can occur pre-trial or as part of someone’s sentence.100 Prosecutors’
offices typically operate diversion programs.101
However, the probation office and the judiciary run diversion programs in
SDNY and EDNY. Grassroots organizations help operate some federal
alternative to incarceration programs; these programs “developed . . .
independently of both the Sentencing Commission and the Judicial
Conference policy.”102 Furthermore, the federal alternative to incarceration
programs require intensive supervision, pre-trial services involvement, and
the time of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.103 The ultimate
financial question is whether these programs warrant the monetary cost given
the savings attributable to reduced recidivism and improved lives. Probation
officers, as well as at least one think tank, say these programs are
cost-efficient.104

96. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise of
Specialized Criminal Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 47, 49 (2017).
97. Micah W. Kubic & Taylor Pendergrass, Diversion Programs Are Cheaper and More
Effective Than Incarceration. Prosecutors Should Embrace Them, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2017,
12:45
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/diversion-programs-are-cheaper-and-more-effective
-incarceration-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/L6R8-QBYQ].
98. See
Diversion,
CTR.
FOR
CT.
INNOVATION,
https://www.courtinnovation.org/areas-of-focus/diversion [https://perma.cc/3WLS-Z3EU]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2020).
99. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 96, at 109.
100. See id. at 53–54, 61.
101. See id. at 56.
102. Kevin T. Wolff et al., A Viable Alternative? Alternatives to Incarceration Across
Seven Federal Districts, U.S. CTS., PRETRIAL SERVS. 8 (Apr. 15, 2019),
http://www.kevintwolff.net/uploads/2/0/1/8/20187445/000_uspt_ati_execsum_041519.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TBQ8-7DS2].
103. See id. at 9.
104. See id. at 7–8, 9–10 (“An analysis of drug court cost-effectiveness conducted by the
Urban Institute found that drug courts provided $2.21 in benefits to the criminal justice system
for every $1 invested. When expanding the program to all at-risk arrestees, the average return
on investment increased even more, resulting in a benefit of $3.36 for every $1 spent.”); see
also Kubic & Pendergrass, supra note 97.
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Typical considerations for program entry include factors such as offense
conduct, history of substance use, mental health circumstances, and criminal
history.105 Professor Christine S. Scott-Hayward clarifies that “although the
benefit of a reduced sentence is significant, it is qualitatively different from
a dismissal of all charges, particularly for defendants with no prior criminal
history.”106
EDNY offers two diversion programs: the Pretrial Opportunity Program
(POP) and the Special Options Services Program (SOS).107 POP is an
alternative-to-incarceration, drug court program in the pre-sentence phase of
a defendant’s case.108 Programs offered pre-trial and pre-sentencing are
particularly motivating for participants because they can potentially avoid or
lessen jail time; sometimes participants can even “avoid a conviction
altogether.”109 The probation office and judiciary run these programs.
SOS is available to those “between the ages of 18 and 25 who are charged
with non-violent crimes and who may benefit from the structure and
direction of intensive supervision.”110 EDNY Judge Jack B. Weinstein
started SOS because he “believed that instead of pretrial detention, many
youthful offenders might benefit more from intensive supervision and access
to education, job training, and counseling.”111 However, SOS is not

105. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 96, at 56.
106. Id. at 58–59.
Criminal convictions carry severe direct consequences, including loss of liberty or
restrictions on liberty, as well as an increasing number of fees and fines. There are
also indirect consequences that diminish an individual’s rights and privileges. These
include denial of public housing and assistance benefits, restrictions on
employment, difficulty obtaining employment, restrictions on access to student
financial aid, and civic exclusion, including ineligibility for jury service and felon
disenfranchisement. The immigration consequences, particularly deportation, of a
criminal conviction are also significant. Further, these consequences can also
impact an individual’s ability to successfully complete their sentence of probation
or to successfully reenter society after release from prison.
Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted).
107. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16. Cordeiro and Penny are Chief Pre-trial Services
Officers for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. See id.
108. See id.
109. U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY, E. DIST. OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION
IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK: THE PRETRIAL OPPORTUNITIES PROGRAM AND THE
SPECIAL
OPTIONS
SERVICES
PROGRAM
8
(2015),
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/ATI.EDNY_.SecondReport.Aug2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GG52-DF4D].
110. Id. at 11–12.
111. Id. at 11.
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available for anyone charged with a terrorism-related offense, even those
deemed non-violent.
Furthermore, EDNY also offers a post-sentence drug court known as
Supervision to Aid Re-entry (STAR).112 STAR participants can begin the
program as an alternative to incarceration at sentencing or as a condition of
supervised release after their time of incarceration or assignment of
probation.113 Though some believe diversion programs are cost-inefficient,
these programs are cost-saving because they reduce the amount of time a
defendant is incarcerated, the amount of time on supervised release and, of
course, recidivism rates.114
Since 2015, SDNY has run the Young Adult Opportunity Program
(YAOP).115 Like SOS, the YAOP helps young people charged with crimes
gain access to counseling, job services, and substance use treatment.116 The
Program is intended to benefit non-violent, young adults (between 18 and 25
years old), but also considers adults over 25 years old on a case-by-case
basis.117 Successful YAOP participants can receive a reduction or deferral
of their charges, a shortened sentence, or even the dismissal of their charges;
the majority of program graduates have avoided a sentence of further
incarceration.118
A report on alternatives to incarceration programs, compiled by federal
pre-trial services officers across the United States, revealed that in seven
federal districts, including EDNY and SDNY, these programs had successful
short-term impacts.119 The programs studied included SDNY’s YAOP and
EDNY’s POP and SOS.120 The results are encouraging — participants
remained employed, abstained from illegal substance use, and were less
likely to be re-arrested.121 Rearrests were “significantly less likely” for
program participants. 122 Strikingly, nearly half of program graduates’ cases
were
dismissed.123
Additionally,
“successful
completers
are . . . significantly less likely to receive a prison term than their matched

112. See id. at 48.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 7–8.
115. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16, at 2–3.
116. See id. at 3.
117. See Young Adult Opportunity Program, U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. N.Y. (May 24, 2018),
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/programs/young-adult-opportunity-program
[https://perma.cc/Q9AW-7ZSP].
118. See Cordeiro & Penny, supra note 16, at 3.
119. See Wolff et al., supra note 102, at 3, 7.
120. See id. at 5–6.
121. See id. at 11.
122. Id. at 6.
123. See id. at 7.
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counterparts” (23% compared to 81%), and “received an average prison
sentence of 4.97 months[;] . . . their matched counterparts were sentenced to
an average of 42 months (ranging from one day to 20 years).”124
The report concluded it is cost-effective to avoid or minimize custody at
the pre-trial and post-conviction stages.125 The federal pre-trial services
officers declared: “[T]he human implications cannot be overstated.”126
Experts know successful reentry is extremely difficult because, after long
stints of incarceration, many people find themselves alienated from healthy
support systems; these support systems are vital for the newly-released
individual to live a law-abiding life.127 Ultimately, diversion programs do
more than just help individual defendants — diversion programs also unite
families, create safer communities, and lessen incarceration rates.128
However, material support defendants are not permitted to participate in any
of SDNY’s or EDNY’s programs, thus leaving a worrisome gap for a
vulnerable group of young adults.129
II. INCAPACITATE OR REHABILITATE: WHAT IS IN THE NATION’S BEST
INTEREST?
Part II questions what is in the nation’s best interest: long terms of
incarceration rooted in specific deterrence, or rehabilitation for vulnerable,
young people who might only be further radicalized in prison? Section II.A
questions what keeps U.S. residents the safest: double-digit sentences with
no rehabilitation and the possibility of further radicalization or options for
rehabilitation and reintegration? Section II.B examines how young people,
defined as those under age 25, are different from adults and reviews a case
study of a young material support defendant to whom an EDNY judge gave
a significantly reduced sentence.
A. What Best Ensures the Nation’s Safety?
As stated in Part I, the material support statutes are intentionally broad to
catch non-violent defendants before they may act violently or assist those
who act violently. The offense conduct, the level of radicalization, and
incarceration’s impact are significant factors when considering public safety.

124. Id.
125. See id. at 11.
126. Id. at 10.
127. See id. at 11.
128. See id. at 10.
129. See Transcript of Bail Application at 33, United States v. Augustine, No.
18-CR-00393 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 24, 2019) (explaining there is no alternative to incarceration
program available for those charged with material support).
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This Section explores what keeps us safest: retributive justice focused on
specific deterrence in the form of long-term incapacitation or rehabilitation
and transformative justice focused on giving young people the opportunity
to change?
i. Differing Theories on Deterrence and Incapacitation
The material support statutes’ architects focused on severe prison time as
a deterrent.130 The threat of legal punishment’s impact is general deterrence
on the public at large; it is meant to encourage other possible law-breakers
to not act criminally.131 The theory of general deterrence suggests that
“imposing a penalty on one person will demonstrate to others the costs of
committing a crime, thus discouraging criminal behavior” by others.132
Specific deterrence “is the extent to which a sentence will ‘persuade [the]
defendant to resist further criminal behavior.’”133 Those focused on
rehabilitation and reintegration view the risk of release as necessary for the
critical possibility that the individual is provided a better life134 and, in the
case of material support defendants, is not further radicalized in prison.135
Although the crime of material support is itself non-violent, it is viewed
more harshly than other non-violent crimes given its connection to terrorism
— one of society’s most feared forms of violence.136 This fear of terrorism
is illustrated in the continued elongating of material support’s statutory
maximum. The sentencing maximum for material support has only been
extended, never reduced — from ten years to 15, to now 20.137 Some judges
believe closer to the maximum of 15 or 20 years is necessary for general and
specific deterrence in material support cases. For example, in 2010,
Sabirhan Hasanoff, a U.S. citizen, was charged in SDNY with conspiracy to

130. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 2; Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1565 (“[J]ust as with
offenders in the War on Drugs, the government’s focus when convicting young American
Muslims in the War on Terror has not been to promote their rehabilitation, but instead to
incapacitate them with lengthy punitive sentences.”).
131. See Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,
80 FED. PROB. 33, 33 (2016).
132. Brian Jacobs, The Role of Publicity in Sentencing, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2017, 4:44 PM)
(quoting
U.S.
District
Judge
Jack
B.
Weinstein),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/10/23/the-role-of-publicity-in-sentencing/#e76fb
03e5c6b [https://perma.cc/YC52-FXWA].
133. Id.
134. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 6–7, 45–46.
135. See infra Section II.A.ii.
136. See Hannah Ritchie et al., Terrorism: Public Opinion on Terrorism, OUR WORLD IN
DATA (Nov. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#public-opinion-on-terrorism
[https://perma.cc/T4WV-BDAN].
137. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 2.
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provide material support in the form of money.138 In September 2013, Judge
Kimba Wood sentenced Hasanoff to 18 years in prison.139 Hasanoff’s
attorney “argued that there are two different kinds of terrorists: those who
renounce what they have done and those who are just diehard and are going
to be this way to the end.”140 In response, Judge Wood stated:
I am puzzled by one facet of this, which is if I were to conclude that Mr.
Hasanoff has essentially turned over a new leaf, if he still believes his
afterlife will be enhanced if he commits jihad, how can I believe that he can
be individually deterred?141

Judge Wood believed the public’s safest option was to incarcerate
Hasanoff for almost the entire 20-year maximum. The judge’s sentence was
rooted in her disbelief that the defendant had, could, or would change his
beliefs.142 Others, including former Assistant U.S. Attorney Johanna Baltes,
believe 15 years is not long enough for many material support defendants
because they, like Baltes, “have not seen a defendant show[] remorse about
what it is they’ve been charged with doing.”143 Former Eastern District of
Virginia Judge Gerald Bruce Lee described: “These are not the typical cases.
You are not going to have anybody with a prior criminal record generally.
You are not going to have somebody come in and say, ‘Well, I renounce my
prior beliefs, and now I am prepared to go forward.’”144 These experts view
rehabilitation as impossible because they assume the defendant is not
interested. But not all experts agree. For example, Director of the Center on
National Security at Fordham Law School, Professor Karen Greenberg,
“think[s] maybe we should consider that there are different levels of
involvement in terrorism.”145 Professor Greenberg goes on to explain that
the material support statutes’ scope reduces the need for judges to make
individualized “distinctions and comparisons that would otherwise be made
in criminal sentencing contexts.”146

138. See Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists: Sentencing Considerations and Their
Policy Implications, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 347, 358 (2015).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. However, Judge Wood recently had a change of heart about Hasanoff. On
October 27, 2020 she granted him compassionate release. See Opinion & Order at 12, United
States v. Hasanoff, No. 10-CR-162 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 27, 2020). Judge Wood released Hasanoff
59 months early, in part so he could help care for his loved ones during the COVID-19
pandemic. See id. at 5–8, 11. Judge Wood stated clearly: “Hasanoff is not a danger to any
person or the community.” Id. at 12.
143. Baltes et al., supra note 138, at 366.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 369.
146. Id.
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Furthermore, most material support defendants’ “actions d[o] not lead to
any identifiable harm or imminent risk of harm.”147 Judges would normally
take this lack of harm into consideration during sentencing “pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s instruction to consider ‘the seriousness of the
offense’ as well as Section 2X1.1(b)(1)–(2) of the Guidelines, which
provides for an offense-level reduction for uncompleted crimes.”148 Because
the terrorism enhancement applies to many material support defendants, the
lack of harm from the offense conduct is often not even considered.149 Under
the Terrorism Enhancement, individuals convicted because of government
sting operations are treated the same as those convicted for actions where the
government had no role in setting them up.150 Terrorism sentencing fails to
consider that when an informant is involved, “a defendant’s intent,
knowledge, and capability of committing the crime is usually much
lower.”151
Not only does the enhancement cause a lack of individualized sentencing,
but also the role of undercover government operatives leads to an inability
to know the defendant’s level of radicalization. As defense attorney Joshua
Dratel stated, “it will always be unclear just what the defendant would have
done — or not done — absent the solicitation, encouragement, and assistance
of government operatives,’ and the defendant ‘might not have presented a
danger except in conjunction with a confidential informant.”152 The
unknown of a defendant’s actions is important when considering the terms
of the individual’s sentence. Were they committed to an FTO or exploring
a new ideology? Why were they drawn to the FTO originally?
Understanding the defendant’s personal story and reasons for interest in an
FTO is important in determining a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).153
This is especially true given that each defendant is entitled to an
individualized sentence.154

147. Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1530.
148. Id. (footnote omitted).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1531 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Joshua L. Dratel, The Literal
Third Way in Approaching “Material Support for Terrorism”: Whatever Happened to 18
U.S.C. § 2339B(c) and the Civil Injunctive Option?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 11, 61 (2011)).
153. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at 458–60.
154. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005).
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ii. The Realities of Radicalization in Prison and the 20-Year Maximum
Sentence
Most defendants are released before the 20-year maximum for a material
support charge.155 And the vast majority of material support defendants are
U.S. citizens.156 Unless convicted of another crime, the U.S.-citizen
defendant will be released to live in the United States. Thus, the remaining
question is, what will happen to these individuals when they are released?
This question is important for all defendants, of course. Society is best
served when defendants leave prison ready to work, to contribute to their
communities, and to serve as supportive family members. But this question
is especially important when it comes to possibly radicalized individuals, no
matter where they are on the radicalization spectrum (not at all radicalized,
merely curious, more radicalized than not, or fully radicalized).
The material support prohibition’s breadth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and
2339B means there are people prosecuted who may not be as much of a true
believer of ISIS or another FTO, or as fully radicalized, as the label
“terrorist” connotates. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme
Court held “[t]he material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive
measure — it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes
the attacks more likely to occur.”157 The preventive nature of the law
combined with the 20-year maximum means there will be people, such as
the person prosecuted for giving $300 to al-Shabab,158 who may not be fully
radicalized but imprisoned. No matter where on the radicalization spectrum,
this Note purports it is best for the broader community if the defendant has
an opportunity to deradicalize.159
In fact, radicalization happens in prison.160 An unintended consequence
of prison sentences could be either further radicalization or the beginning of

155. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 21.
156. See id. at 3.
157. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010).
158. See TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD, supra note 39, at 20.
159. See generally Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, America’s Terrorism Problem
Doesn’t End with Prison — It Might Just Begin There, LAWFARE (June 17, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/americas-terrorism-problem-doesnt-end-prison—
it-might-just-begin-there [https://perma.cc/FL4Q-ARKX] (stating that “Elaine Duke,
then-acting secretary at the Department of Homeland Security, . . . acknowledged before
Congress that ‘we need to work with the Department of Justice and its Bureau of Prisons . . .
to make sure [convicted terrorists] do not return to violence once released’”).
160. See id. See generally GREG HANNAH ET AL., RAND CORP., RADICALIZATION OR
REHABILITATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE OF EXTREMIST AND RADICALIZED
PRISONERS
(2008),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E52R-LV7F].
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radicalization for someone who was never radicalized to begin with.161 As
socio-legal scholar Richard Abel explains, there are many terrorism
defendants who, “[s]eeking a sense of meaning through identification with a
larger group and cause, . . . were easily manipulated.”162 If someone was
never radicalized to begin with, incarceration will certainly not prevent
further radicalization. Instead, incarceration may serve as the very impetus
for radicalization.163 A study by the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation and Political Violence shows that of the ISIS supporters
interviewed, over one in four164 stated they were not radicalized before
prison — that they became radicalized for the very first time in prison.165
Young people charged or convicted of material support are particularly
susceptible to radicalization tactics in prison because, for most, it is their first
time behind bars.166 Extremist incarcerated recruiters understand that

161. See Vidino & Hughes, supra note 159 (explaining that various countries learned that
incarcerating people convicted of terrorism does not solve the problem because “[i]n jail,
terrorists network and proselytize, making the problem worse”). It is concerning “that the
United States has not developed a comprehensive system to rehabilitate individuals convicted
for terrorism while they are incarcerated.” Id.
162. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAW’S TRIALS: THE PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE
US “WAR ON TERROR” 72 (2018).
163. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
VIOLENT EXTREMIST PRISONERS AND THE PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENCE IN
PRISONS 109 (2016) (“[P]rison radicalization to violence is an issue of considerable
importance and recruitment attempts, successful or otherwise, do occur.”).
164. Of 79 people interviewed, at least 27% said they were first radicalized in prison. Oscar
Schneider, European Prisons Breeding Grounds for Jihadists, BRUSSELS TIMES (Oct. 11,
2016),
https://www.brusselstimes.com/all-news/world-all-news/justice-world/39556/european-pris
ons-breeding-grounds-for-jihadists/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ7A-ZLHJ].
165. See Florence Gaub & Julia Lisiecka, The Crime-Terrorism Nexus, EUR. UNION INST.
FOR
SEC.
STUD.
(EUISS)
2
(2017),
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_10_Terrorism_and_crime.pd
f [https://perma.cc/N87T-P7DG] (“[P]rison can act as an incubator for jihadists since it
facilitates the creation of networks between petty criminals and jihadist ideologues, as well as
the formation of likeminded cells. The poor conditions in some prisons, as well as the
prospects of a difficult restart following release can foster an environment conducive to
networking. The Charlie Hebdo attacker Cherif Kouachi met Amedy Coulibaly in Europe’s
largest prison, Fleury-Mérogis, both were mentored there by Djamel Baghdal, an al-Qaeda
recruiter.” After they were released from prison, they continued to meet and were involved in
the jailbreak of another extremist person. Coulibaly stated that “prison is the best fucking
school of crime. In the same walk, you can meet Corsicans, Basques, Muslims, robbers,
small-time drug dealers, big traffickers, murderers . . . you learn from years of experience”).
166. See CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS, supra note 11, at 26. Additionally, the
radicalization process does not happen linearly. See FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
AT
N.Y.U.,
RETHINKING
RADICALIZATION
10–11
(2011),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf
[https://perma.cc/98G2-FJPR] (“Empirical research on radicalization conclusively shows that
the path to terrorism is far from linear. While studies have identified various factors that may
influence the process, including personal circumstances, perceptions of injustice (both local
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someone’s first time in prison is usually “a period characterized by feeling
lonely and frightened.”167 Those who are incarcerated often lose their sense
of self and completely lose their autonomy.168 These recruiters also
“understand that . . . their ability to recruit young, first-time offenders into
their” extremist group, and “feed them back . . . to a network outside the
prison” allows recruiters to persuade these first-time offenders “to carry out
terror acts on behalf of the group.”169 A report by the RAND Corporation
further describes the process of radicalization in prison and why it is so
common, stating that a “cognitive opening” to radicalization is formed
because incarcerated individuals are more “susceptibl[e] to new and
radicalizing ideas or beliefs.”170 There are striking similarities between what

and international), exposure to ideology that promotes violence as ‘jihad,’ and social bonds,
it simply does not support the notion of a clear path from personal or political discontent to
violence.”).
167. Anne Speckhard & Ardian Shajkovci, Prison — Militant Jihadist Recruiting Grounds
or Refuge for Rehabilitation?, INT’L CTR. FOR STUDY VIOLENT EXTREMISM (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.icsve.org/prison-militant-jihadist-recruiting-grounds-or-refuge-for-rehabilitatio
n/ [https://perma.cc/YS7S-HX83]. Loneliness occurs because, while incarcerated, people tend
to be cut off from family and friends.
Separation from the regular day-to-day support that may be supplied by such
relationships causes psychological stress at a time when the new prisoner is facing
a traumatic set of conditions and going through a difficult adjustment. Social
support and supportive relationships are known to be important for individuals’
physical and emotional health and supportive relationships have been shown to
protect individuals against offending in the future.
HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 6 (citations and footnote omitted).
168. HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 6 (explaining that an incarcerated person’s
understanding of self is threatened because they are “deprived of personal or sentimental
possessions.” For example, people “may use clothing and other personal items as symbols
and reminders of their personal affiliations and ties to groups and identities” — removing
“such items is part of the process of stripping away prisoners’ autonomy and selfhood”).
Furthermore, the prison environment completely removes an individual’s “control of their
daily routine, and replaces it with an array of imposed rules and regulations and bureaucratic
controls.” Also, “the imposition of harsh and arbitrary discipline and the removal of the
prisoners’ ability to make decisions for themselves poses a significant threat to their
self-image and sense of self-efficacy, as it effectively reduces them to the status of helpless
children.” Id. at 7.
169. See Speckhard & Shajkovci, supra note 167.
170. HANNAH ET AL., supra note 160, at 50.
A number of young European Muslims perceive themselves to be rejected by
Western society. Under such circumstances people tend to seek to re-establish or
confirm their sense of personal and group identity. The prison context may sharpen
or exacerbate such experiences of rejection and prejudice, and increase the urgent
need to find way of coping with or overcoming these threats to self-identity.
Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
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are believed to be the forces leading to the radicalization of young people
and the psychological impact of imprisonment upon individuals; specifically
undergoing a crisis of the self, which challenges or even destroys one’s
self-conception, experiencing acute feelings of rejection by one’s native or
adopted society and seeking to cope by adopting a new sense of
self-identify or a new belief, which may be delivered in adopting a new
belief structure (religious or otherwise) and being assimilated into a new
inclusive (and frequently protective) group identity.171

Given the psychological and physical dangers presented by prison,
incarcerating young people can compound their vulnerabilities into
radicalization.172
Furthermore, because most material support defendants will return home,
continued or further radicalization in prison should be viewed as a broader
public safety issue. The National Counterterrorism Center released a report
stating that in 2016 there were 300 currently incarcerated people convicted
of terrorism-related crimes, 90 of whom are due to be released before
2022.173 Jessica Stern, a professor at Boston University specializing in
extremism and the author of Isis: The State of Terror, explained: “At least
some will probably reengage in terrorist activity . . . because they either
remain radicalized or are susceptible to re-radicalization.”174 Thus,
supervised release is particularly important for material support defendants.
iii. The Role of Supervised Release
When someone is released from federal prison or jail, they are often
placed on supervised release.175 Supervised release is another way in which
the court can give an individualized sentence and remedy to a defendant.
Standard conditions of federal supervised release include reporting to a
probation officer (PO), notifying a PO when leaving specific geographical
areas, lawful employment, and notification of a change in residence.176
Special conditions of supervision can include place restrictions, intermittent
confinement, polygraph tests, computer and internet restrictions, and

171. Id. at 50.
172. See id. at x.
173. See Walters, supra note 2.
174. Id. (alteration in original).
175. See Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/overview-probation-supervised-release-conditions
[https://perma.cc/2GMU-9G7M] (last visited Oct. 22, 2020); Supervised Release, FED. DEFS.
N.Y.,
https://federaldefendersny.org/information-for-client-and-families/supervised-release.html
[https://perma.cc/VN33-T8V8] (last visited Oct. 16, 2020).
176. See Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions, supra note 175.
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community service.177 Judges use supervised release as a mechanism for
reintegrating the defendant back into society and protecting the public;
judges can also choose creative supervised release tactics.178
Although supervised release may seem, on its face, not punitive,
significant liberty is stripped away from individuals. Unlike parole,
supervised release is an “additional penalty.”179 If a defendant is on
supervised release for over ten years, which many material support
defendants are,180 that is a decade of drug screening, weekly calls to a PO,
and limited internet access, as well as limitations on where a defendant can
go, work, and visit. This results in criminalizing non-criminal actions. There
are many collateral consequences of technical supervised release violations,
including curfews that make it harder to find employment, limitations on
often-needed licenses and other registrations, and failed drug tests — any of
which can land the person back in federal custody.181 Supervised release can
include near-constant surveillance with “no clear process to register
grievances or appeal decisions.”182

177. See id.
178. See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
supervised release conditions are designed to protect the public and rehabilitate the
defendant).
179. See Jacob Schuman, Supervised Release Is Not Parole, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 587, 623
(2020). In the United States, there are 4.5 million people serving terms of criminal
supervision, which includes probation, parole, and supervised release.
This “mass supervision” of convicted defendants is, as the District Attorney of
Philadelphia Larry Krasner recently said, “a major driver of mass incarceration.”
Currently, almost 300,000 people are incarcerated for violating conditions of their
supervision — one third of all prisoners in thirteen states, and more than half of all
prisoners in Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, and Wisconsin.
Id. at 589.
180. See generally ISIS in America, supra note 25. For example, Yusuf was sentenced to
20 years of supervised release. See Twin Cities Man Who Tried to Join ISIS Is Released from
Halfway
House,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Nov.
21,
2017,
6:44
PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2017/11/09/twin-cities-man-who-tried-to-join-isis-is-released-fr
om-halfway-house/ [https://perma.cc/6SYL-SENY].
181. See Schuman, supra note 179, at 626. Schuman goes on to explain how “‘[w]hat was
originally designed to assist re-integration into the community,’ instead is ‘facilitating
reincarceration.’” Id. at 629 (footnote omitted).
182. Topeka K. Sam, It’s Time to Overhaul America’s Broken Probation and Parole
Systems,
OPEN
SOC’Y
FOUNDS.
(July
13,
2017),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/it-s-time-overhaul-america-s-broken-probati
on-and-parole-systems [https://perma.cc/PX56-2PX8]. Sam has personally experienced
living under supervised release conditions. See id. In 2019, “the Supreme Court took a small
step against mass supervision by striking down one provision of the supervised release statute
as violating the defendant’s right to a jury trial” in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369
(2019). Schuman, supra note 179, at 589–90 (footnotes omitted).
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The intensity of supervised release should be reassessed given there has
been very little recidivism of those convicted of crimes of terror since
September 11. The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): Examining
Recidivism Rates for Post-9/11 Offenders illustrates that recidivism for
terrorism-related offenders is extremely low.183 In total, nine out of 561
offenders recidivated while incarcerated or upon release.184 “Of the 247
offenders . . . released during the course of the study, four recidivated” by
committing new crimes or violating supervised release terms.185 None of
these new crimes were connected to terrorism.186 For example, one person
was re-incarcerated for two years for “committ[ing] fraud by illegally buying
food stamps.”187 This indicates a recidivism rate of approximately 1.6%
among released political extremists.188 In comparison, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics reported “that within the first year, 44% of the sample of [state
prisoners] had been rearrested and, within three years, 68% had been
re-arrested.”189 These findings suggest that the heavy “surveillance of
released political extremists . . . are unwarranted.”190

183. See Omi Hodwitz, The Terrorism Recidivism Study (TRS): Examining Recidivism
Rates for Post-9/11 Offenders, 13 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 54, 54 (2019). The study examines
recidivism rates of offenders convicted in the United States of terrorism-related offenses
post-9/11.
184. Id. at 60. The study guaranteed that each of the cases or offenders were “validated by
two or more credible sources.” Id. at 56. “This produced a set of 561 recidivism-eligible
individuals convicted of terrorism-related offenses in the United States between September
of 2001 and March of 2018.” Id.
185. Id. at 54, 60.
186. See id. at 60. The four recidivated by “violat[ing] plea agreement by using the
internet,” “committ[ing] fraud by illegally buying food stamps,” “forgery and uttering,” and
“parole violation due to drug possession.” Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 54 (explaining why “[t]hese findings suggest that restrictive policies designed
to increase surveillance of released political extremists, such as the recently proposed
TRACER Act and other registry-based measures, are unwarranted”). “In addition to the low
rates of recidivism, it is also noteworthy that five of the recidivists reoffended while still
incarcerated, dropping the total number of released recidivists to four. Those that reoffended
in prison were charged with attempted murder and attempting to radicalize others.” Id. at 59.
189. Id. at 60.
190. Id. at 54. Hodwitz then goes on to explain that
political offenders were less likely to recidivate than apolitical offenders and, when
they did recidivate, they did so in the years immediately following their release. In
other words, although political and apolitical offenders are very similar in gender,
age, and race, there are dramatic differences between these two groups when it
comes [to] recidivism rates and, to a lesser extent, to the length of time between
release and rearrest.
Id. at 61.
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B. Young People’s Ability to Rehabilitate
Young people’s brains are undeveloped and, therefore, more open to
change.191 Adolescent brain maturation extends from 11 to 25 years of age;
adolescents have reduced culpability because they are naturally predisposed
to impulsive decision-making and negative peer influence.192 ISIS and other
extremist groups prey on young people’s immaturity when recruiting.193 The
Supreme Court recognizes three factors reducing adolescent criminal
culpability: (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility often resulting in impetuous decision-making, (2) adolescents
are more susceptible to negative influence through peer pressure, and (3)
adolescents’ characters are more transitory than those of adults.194
Both neuroscience and developmental psychology support the factors the
Supreme Court outlined.195 For example, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme
Court held that juvenile life sentences without parole for non-homicide
offenses were unconstitutional.196 The American Medical Association and
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry filed an amicus
brief stating that “[s]cientists have found that adolescents as a group, even at
later stages of adolescence, are more likely than adults to engage in risky,
impulsive, and sensation-seeking behavior.”197 Young people have less
impulse control.198 They are impressionable to negative influences,
emotionally irrational, and overestimate short-term rewards.199

191. See generally Allan Colver & Sarah Longwell, New Understanding of Adolescent
Brain Development: Relevance to Transitional Healthcare for Young People with Long Term
Conditions, 98 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 902 (2013).
192. See id.
193. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED
AND EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS: THE ROLE OF THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 13 (2017) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED],
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_
Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role
_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDJ5-RDED].
194. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
195. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
811–19 (2003).
196. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). Justice Kennedy’s opinion explained
that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a
juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime.
See id.
197. Stephen A. Newman, Foreword: The Past, Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice
Reform in New York State, 56 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 1263, 1289 (2012).
198. See id.
199. See id. (“For example, brain imaging studies reveal that adolescents generally exhibit
more neural activity than adults or children in areas of the brain that promote risky and
reward-based behavior. These studies also demonstrate that the brain continues to mature,
both structurally and functionally, throughout adolescence in regions of the brain responsible
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The Court directly agreed with these medical experts that there are
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”200
Developmental psychologists and the Court are on the same page that
differences between adult and adolescent decision-making should translate
into differences in sentencing.201 The Court in Miller v. Alabama held that
children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes,
and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment forbids the mandatory sentencing of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders.202 Although
18-year-olds are considered adults, “neuroscientists [and psychologists
agree] that the brain’s prefrontal cortex — which is responsible for the ability
to delay gratification, exercise emotional regulation, and resist pressure —
continuously grows well into our mid-twenties.”203 These developing
“brains explain much of teenagers’ and adolescents’ impatience and rash
decisions,” and therefore reduced culpability.204 Brain development
continues into a person’s twenties and early thirties.205 In fact, some
lawmakers have started to change criminal laws in accordance with this
science. For example, California lawmakers amended a law focused on
re-sentencing juvenile offenders to include those who were under 23 years
old at the time the crime was committed.206 Vermont allows some people up
to age 22 to go through the family, not criminal, court system.207
Additionally, in Europe, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands

for controlling thoughts, actions, and emotions.”). Generally speaking, “the average
adolescent cannot be expected to act with the same control or foresight as a mature adult.” Id.
200. Id. at 1290 (footnote omitted).
201. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 195, at 839–40.
202. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2012).
203. HADAR AVIRAM, YESTERDAY’S MONSTERS: THE MANSON FAMILY CASES AND THE
ILLUSION OF PAROLE 212 (2020).
204. Id.
205. See Dana Goldstein, Should 25-Year-Olds Be Tried as Juveniles?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/138133/25-year-olds-tried-juveniles
[https://perma.cc/8ESN-S4MU].
Social change is as important as biological change in understanding why some
people in this age group are drawn to crime. Individuals who are “disconnected” —
neither working nor in school — are more likely to get in trouble with the law.
While fewer young women are disconnected today than in previous decades, the
opposite is true for young men.
Id. (emphasis in original).
206. See AVIRAM, supra note 203, at 214.
207. See Goldstein, supra note 205.
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classify all defendants up until their mid-twenties as juveniles; they are not
tried in adult criminal court.208
Traditionally, responses to juvenile crime have focused more on
rehabilitation than in the adult realm. Extremist organizations often recruit
young people using methods “similar to those employed by sexual predators:
gaining trust and establishing rapport, fulfilling emotional needs, and then
isolating a victim from family and friends.”209 Social media manipulation is
rampant in connecting young people to extremist groups. Young people are
recruited via social media through two primary strategies:210 (1) “grooming,
[which] is based on the perpetrator learning about the individual’s interests
in order to tailor the approach and build up a relationship of trust,”211 and (2)
“targeted advertising,” where a group, “by tracking the online [behavior] of
Internet users, . . . can identify those vulnerable to its propaganda and tailor
the narrative to suit its target audience.”212 Internet communities become an
echo chamber filled with others holding similar opinions.213 Young people
often become radicalized through the internet because, as Bellevue/NYU
Program for Survivors of Torture clinical psychologist Katherine Porterfield
explains, “[t]hey sit in their room and they have a constant feed of language
that enhances their sense of grievance and that the failures that they have are
related to a larger mission.”214 They become “alienated from the people who
would help them seek alternate routes and it fuels their future actions.”215
ISIS maximizes its reach by sharing its message on Twitter, Facebook,
and peer-to-peer messaging apps.216 Social media content — including

208. See id. Additionally, just because a young person is provided the opportunity to be
charged as a juvenile and not an adult does not remove detention’s negative impact. See id.
Research shows that even detention in a juvenile facility is “‘criminogenic,’ meaning it makes
it more likely that a person will reoffend, compared to a juvenile who committed a similar
crime, but was not incarcerated.” Id.
209. Berkell, supra note 17, at 42 (footnote omitted).
210. See HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED, supra note 193, at 13.
211. Id.
212. Id. (footnote omitted).
213. See Ali Chunovic, #WSF18: What Causes Extremism in the Brain?, DANA FOUND.
(June 7, 2018), https://www.dana.org/article/wsf18-what-causes-extremism-in-the-brain/
[https://perma.cc/T7BJ-NVN6].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Brendan I. Koerner, Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War, WIRED (Apr. 2016)
[hereinafter
Koerner,
Why
ISIS
Is
Winning],
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/
[https://perma.cc/DU8A-2WWX] (explaining that ISIS “releases, on average, 38 new items
per day — 20-minute videos, full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and
pamphlets, in languages ranging from Russian to Bengali”). In the fall of 2014, ISIS
supporters controlled 45,000 Twitter accounts. Since then, Twitter has been aggressively
suspending accounts. See Humera Khan, Why Countering Extremism Fails, FOREIGN AFFS.
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cartoons, computer games, and other interactive media217 — is focused on
persuading possible recruits of the organization’s strength and that it is open
to all.218 Joining an extremist group is portrayed as “offering status and
prestige, smart uniforms and weapons.”219 The experience is illustrated as
an opportunity for power, especially to those without educational
opportunities or employment.220 ISIS recruitment also often focuses on
“victimhood,” utilizing visuals that inspire “a desire to carry out revenge.”221
In a material support case with nine young defendants, a judge found it
difficult to consider long sentences because the defendants were “malleable
youths who were ensnared by sly recruiting tactics: They were often lured
into the group with invitations to pick-up basketball games, which were
followed by late-night screenings of jihadist YouTube videos.”222
Law enforcement officials rely on community partnerships to help root
out extremism, but this trust in law enforcement is broken when young
people are aggressively prosecuted for non-violent crimes of terrorism.223
For example, Sal Shafi notified the FBI that his 21-year-old son, Adam, was
engaging with extremist communities online.224 The worried father assisted
the FBI with their investigation, but ultimately thought his son just needed
counseling and community support.225 The government charged Adam with
attempting to provide material support to the al-Nusra Front; he faced a
prison sentence of up to 20 years.226 Adam awaited trial in solitary
confinement.227 Mr. Shafi now warns parents who face similar dilemmas to
“not . . . even consider involving the authorities.”228 The Shafi family’s

(Feb.
18,
2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremis
m-fails [https://perma.cc/989N-JY5V].
217. HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED, supra note 193, at 12–13.
218. See Koerner, Why ISIS Is Winning, supra note 216.
219. HANDBOOK ON CHILDREN RECRUITED AND EXPLOITED, supra note 193, at 12.
220. See id.
221. Id.
222. Brendan I. Koerner, A US Judge May Sentence Wannabe Terrorists to
‘Deradicalization,’ WIRED (Nov. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Koerner, A US Judge May Sentence],
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/u-s-judge-may-sentence-wannabe-terrorists-deradicalizatio
n/ [https://perma.cc/AW9W-MMU8].
223. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 42.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id. Young people’s radicalization calls into question “the complex issues confronting
law enforcement and communities when youth are suspected of supporting violent
extremism.” Id. at 43. For example, a group of teenage girls, 15, 16, and 17 years old, were
stopped in Germany on their way to join ISIS in Turkey. See id. Ultimately, they were not
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situation represents how prosecution, not rehabilitation, is the government’s
most common immediate response and ultimate solution to young people
engaging with extremist ideas.
i. United States v. Ceasar: Why an EDNY Judge Disregarded Sentencing
Recommendations for a Young Material Support Defendant
Some district court judges use a framework of lessened culpability for
young defendants, even those charged with material support to ISIS. In
United States v. Ceasar, EDNY Judge Weinstein granted a 24-year-old
defendant charged with material support to ISIS a four-year sentence — a
dramatic downward departure from the 30 to 50 years the government
recommended.229 For at least 11 months, Ceasar had actively sought to
support and assist ISIS.230 Ceasar showed her support by encouraging
people, via social media, to join and assist ISIS.231 Ceasar planned to travel
to ISIS territory.232
Judge Weinstein considered many mitigating factors in her sentencing,
including that her family repeatedly abused and neglected her.233 She was
forced to participate in ceremonial marriages with men many years older and
was abused and neglected by multiple foster families.234 Ceasar’s living
situation was often unstable — at times she lived in homeless shelters.235
Judge Weinstein concluded that “[t]he ideal sentence, in the court’s
estimation following the hearing, would be Defendant’s placement in a
deradicalization or disengagement program with provision for intensive
educational, emotional, and economic support to address her childhood
trauma and its attendant results.”236 Judge Weinstein’s focus on treatment,
as opposed to incarceration, speaks to the values society holds for young
people — they are susceptible to negative influences, their brains are not
fully developed, and they deserve opportunities deemed unfit for those who

charged with any crimes — even the girls’ school district claimed “they were victims of online
predators, and not deeply motivated by a desire to fight with ISIS.” Id.
229. See United States v. Caesar, 388 F. Supp. 3d 194, 218, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). For a
judge’s viewpoint that contrasts with Judge Weinstein’s logic, see supra Section II.A.i. SDNY
Judge Kimba Wood believed the public’s safest option was to incarcerate Hasanoff for almost
the entire 20-year maximum. She sentenced him to 18 years for conspiring to provide material
support. See id. The judge’s sentence was rooted in her disbelief that the defendant had, could,
or would change his beliefs. See Baltes et al., supra note 138, at 358.
230. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 200.
231. See id. at 200–01.
232. See id. at 202.
233. See id. at 215, 220.
234. See id. at 197, 215, 220.
235. See id. at 197.
236. Id. at 220.
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are older. There is less reason to incapacitate a young person because there
is more reason to trust the young defendant can, and wants to, alter their life’s
path.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF TERRORISM-RELATED DIVERSION
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND
Part III examines the current state of terrorism-related diversion programs
in the United States and around the world. Section III.A examines the only
terrorism diversion program in the United States, located in the District of
Minnesota. Section III.B explores what can be learned from other countries,
focusing on Western Europe and Saudi Arabia, who use diversion programs
to deradicalize. III.C explains the pitfalls of diversion programs generally
and the pitfalls of countering violent extremism programs specifically.
A. Minneapolis’s Diversion Program for a Young Person Charged with
Material Support
The District of Minnesota created the only diversion program in the
country for a young person charged with a terrorism-related offense.237
Judge Michael J. Davis of the District of Minnesota approved the program
in 2016.238 The program aimed to rehabilitate the young defendants “to
becom[e] successful, law-abiding citizens,” to supervise and monitor
defendants pre-trial and post-incarceration, and to provide the court with
information useful for sentencing people charged with crimes of terrorism.239
Judge Davis decided young people who acted as ISIS recruiters should be
given the opportunity to improve their lives through a process of
re-pluralization.240 “Re-pluralization,” coined by German radicalization
expert Daniel Koehler,241 is “the careful reintroduction of problems and
solutions into a radicalized person’s life so that they can no longer devote all
their mental energy to stewing over their paranoia.”242 It is helping young

237. See Dina Temple-Raston, A Model for De-Radicalization in Minneapolis, NPR (Feb.
19, 2015, 4:05 PM) [hereinafter Temple-Raston, A Model for De-Radicalization],
https://www.npr.org/2015/02/19/387554218/a-model-for-de-radicalization-in-minneapolis
[https://perma.cc/QFU4-AV9V] (explaining that the program developed for Yusuf is
“America’s first de-radicalization program, something to turn to when countering violent
extremism efforts fall short”).
238. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 47.
239. See id. at 48.
240. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
241. See id.; Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
242. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; see also infra Section IV.B
(explaining more about re-pluralization).
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people understand that life and problem solving can be seen in complex
shades of gray, as opposed to binary black and white.
i. The Minneapolis Diversion Program’s History
Before the arrests of nine young Somali-American youths, there were
already community conversations about how to prevent radicalization in
Minneapolis’s Somali community.
This started when the Obama
Administration, in 2011, released the first national strategy to prevent violent
extremism domestically.243 The strategy focused on community-based
approaches, believing that knowledgeable and supported families,
communities, and organizations are the best defense against violent
extremism.244 Three cities participated in the pilot program: Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Boston, and Los Angeles.245 A listening tour then took place in
Minneapolis.246 They discussed community-identified root causes of
radicalization: “disaffected youth,” “a deepening disconnect between youth
and religious leaders,” “internal identity crises,” “community isolation[,] and
lack of opportunity — including high unemployment, lack of activities for
youth, and few mentors.”247
Subsequently, in 2014 and 2015, nine Somali-American youths aged 18
to 22 were charged with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS.248
Six of the teenagers pled guilty.249 The three other teenagers went to trial in
what was deemed “America’s largest ISIS recruitment trial.”250 The six
young men who pleaded guilty were sentenced to prison or rehabilitation.251
Abdullahi Yusuf, who was 18 at the time of his offense, agreed to
rehabilitation.252

243. See generally EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED
STATES
(2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES6M-F6Y6].
244. See id.
245. See Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program A
Community-Led Local Framework, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. DIST. OF MINN. 2 (Feb. 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/download [https://perma.cc/LWG4-A2JB].
246. See id. at 4.
247. Id. (explaining how “[t]his framework was developed after months of listening to the
community about its needs as well as reviewing available research and talking with experts”).
248. See Ibrahim, supra note 4.
249. See id.
250. Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7. Yusuf “testified he was introduced to
radical Islam by the three men now on trial, Guled Omar, 22, Abdirahman Daud, 22, and
Mohamed Farah, 21.” Id.
251. See id.; Ibrahim, supra note 4.
252. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
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ii. Critical Aspects of the Minneapolis Program
Judge Davis, along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Minnesota, created a pilot program — the District of Minnesota’s Terrorism
Disengagement and Deradicalization Program.253 The program aimed to
combat the fact that “[u]ntreated radicalized individuals [would] infect
communities and continue to seek opportunities to harm others and martyr
themselves.”254 Yusuf began the program pre-sentencing after he pled guilty
to material support charges and cooperated with the government.255
Yusuf, who was born in a Kenyan refugee camp, immigrated to
Minneapolis with his family after they fled conflict in Somalia.256 He
attended high school in Minneapolis and was on the football team.257 Yusuf
became “part of a . . . pattern in which children of some immigrant families
in North America and Europe feel alienated from society[;] a small but
concerning few turn to jihad.”258 At his co-conspirators’ trial, Yusuf testified
about the radicalization process:
[It] was frightening simple. It began with a meal at a Somali restaurant and
a pickup game of basketball . . . . [S]mart phones came out of their pockets
and the young men began watching ISIS videos on a YouTube channel
called “Enter the Truth.” They stayed up until 2 a.m . . . . talking about the
killing in Syria and watching ISIS videos.259

Yusuf further explained that “[t]he channel is saying that the West is corrupt
and you can follow religion perfectly over there [in Syria] . . . [a]nd you
don’t have to conform to anyone else’s traditions.”260
Judge Davis appointed Daniel Koehler, the founder of the German
Institute for Radicalization and Deradicalization Studies and a fellow at
George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to create the
program.261 Koehler explained that he
ha[s] already seen fierce criticism from the law-and-order people, saying
these are terrorists and they don’t deserve to be treated by any
program, . . . . [b]ut we need to have another option, because we can’t kill
or imprison our way out of why ISIS looks cool to these kids.262

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
Id.
See Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
See Walters, supra note 2.
See Temple-Raston, A Model for De-Radicalization, supra note 237.
Walters, supra note 2.
Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
Id.
See Walters, supra note 2.
Koerner, A US Judge May Sentence, supra note 222.
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Koehler further described that “[t]he US, unfortunately, is about 20 or 25
years behind European countries in building these kinds of networks and
programs. Intervention to counter violent extremism is really missing.”263
Koehler thinks the program is not only useful to deradicalize individuals, but
also to cultivate trust with the communities that are most at risk for
radicalization.264 Koehler’s theory of change for these young people is
through re-pluralization — learning to see life and problem-solving in the
gray, not stark black and white. Successful re-pluralization, “los[ing] the
fervor that once made them eager to [harm others],” requires substantial
resources, including an “intervention coordinator” and multiple mentors who
work with the client for years.265
Yusuf’s process of re-pluralization entailed incremental stages of
freedom,266 family and individual therapy, and lengthy reading lists.267
Heartland Democracy, a small Minneapolis-based nonprofit, was hired to
help facilitate the program for Yusuf because of its work with Somali youth
in Minneapolis.268 Heartland Democracy’s executive director, Mary
McKinley, took an existing program entitled “Empowering You” and
customized it for Yusuf, “[t]he idea [being] to make disaffected young
people and their parents feel more connected, to each other and to their
communities.”269 McKinley stated that the “program works with young
people to connect with themselves, their community and their world. We
believe that when young people make bad choices — some extremely bad
choices — there’s still an opportunity to turn your life around.”270
McKinley worked in conjunction with Ahmed Amin, a local
Somali-American high school social studies teacher.271 Amin served as
Yusuf’s primary counselor and described his empathy for Yusuf:
I understand the difficulties of identity that lead people to join organizations
like ISIS . . . . It is hard trying to live in two worlds. From 9 to 5 these kids
have to live one way when they are at school, they are socialized to be

263. Walters, supra note 2; see also infra Section III.A.i.
264. See Koerner, A US Judge May Sentence, supra note 222.
265. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
266. See Temple-Raston, A Model for De-Radicalization, supra note 237 (explaining that
the program developed for Yusuf is “America’s first de-radicalization program, something to
turn to when countering violent extremism efforts fall short”).
267. See Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
268. See id.
269. Temple-Raston, A Model for De-Radicalization, supra note 237.
270. Paul McEnroe, Minneapolis Nonprofit Tests Program to Pull Teens from Terror’s
Grasp,
STAR
TRIBUNE
(Apr.
29,
2015),
http://www.startribune.com/mpls-nonprofit-tries-to-pull-teens-from-terror-s-grasp/30132581
1/ [https://perma.cc/S3B7-8ARK].
271. See Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.

234

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

American. And then they go home, learn to be religious and are trying to
cope with that. It is harder than you’d think.272

During his year at a federal halfway house, Yusuf read philosophy,
biography, and literature; he wrote essays and poetry, reflecting on his life,
his choices, and his future; and he was encouraged to debate with mentors
and Muslim community leaders.273 Amin introduced Yusuf to many
different texts so that he “could really challenge how he thinks and sees the
world.”274 Yusuf also read and discussed the works of Sherman Alexie,
Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and Michel Foucault, with the aim of
“work[ing] through barriers, both mental and societal.”275
Of the nine Somali teenagers who were originally charged with conspiring
to provide material support to ISIS in 2016, only Yusuf was deemed
trustworthy enough for a time-served sentence and therefore immediate
release after two years of incarceration and one year in the re-pluralization
program.276 At Yusuf’s sentencing, Judge Davis declared, “I just don’t see
how prison will help this boy”277 — Yusuf was ultimately sentenced to 20
years of supervised release.278 At Yusuf’s sentencing, his PO testified that
“while in the halfway house, Yusuf earned his high school diploma,
underwent counseling and participated in community service. Yusuf even
became a role model for other residents.”279 One of Yusuf’s lawyers
explained, “[h]is transformation has been incredible. He went from being a
surly, closed-down kid to this really open, warm, intelligent, thoughtful,
introspective young man, who recognizes why he’d been attracted to Isis and
why there are so many other options for him.”280 Yusuf’s success
pre-sentencing was one step toward gaining additional freedoms. Upon his
release, Judge Davis ordered supervised release conditions that included

272. Id. (quoting Amin Ahmed, Yusuf’s counselor). Amin further explained: “You know,
these are really young kids . . . and in my heart I really believe that they fell for something.
They need a chance to correct, to undo, what they did.” Id.
273. See Walters, supra note 2.
274. Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
275. Walters, supra note 2; see also Temple-Raston, He Was Caught, supra note 7.
276. See Walters, supra note 2.
277. Dina Temple-Raston, He Wanted Jihad. He Got Foucault., N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 27,
2017)
(quoting
Judge
Michael
J.
Davis),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/11/abdullahi-yusuf-isis-syria.html
[https://perma.cc/ZV4D-PQ24].
278. See Walters, supra note 2.
279. Stephen Montemayor, First of Minnesota’s ISIS Defendants Wins Release from
Federal Halfway House, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 9, 2017, 11:17 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/yusuf-wins-release-from-halfway-house-in-isis-case/456407163
/ [https://perma.cc/3CJD-HVEV].
280. Walters, supra note 2.
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approval of all education and employment plans.281 Additionally, Yusuf’s
internet use was monitored, he was tracked via GPS, and he was not
permitted to access extremist materials or use social media.282 Yusuf will
live under supervised release for 20 years unless Judge Davis decides to
reduce his term.283
B. What Can Be Learned from Other Countries That Successfully
Utilize These Programs
For decades, other nations have regularly utilized deradicalization and
disengagement programs with the goal to deradicalize those facing crimes of
terrorism, both pre-trial and after conviction.284 Previously, European
rehabilitation programs were directed at violent right-wing extremists, such
Recently, European
as neo-Nazis and nationalist extremists.285
programming turned its focus to Jihadist-inspired extremists.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, or both oversee
more than 40 terrorism-related diversion programs throughout the world.286
A crucial difference between those charged with terrorism-related crimes in
the United States versus elsewhere is that terrorism sentences are generally
shorter in other countries.287 Rehabilitation is needed quickly because
defendants will be released in a matter of months, as opposed to possible
decades in the United States.288

281. See Montemayor, supra note 279.
282. See id.; see also Twin Cities Man Who Tried to Join ISIS Is Released from Halfway
House, supra note 180 (“While at the halfway house, Yusuf received counseling, mentoring
and an award for being a role model to other residents. As condition of his release, Yusuf is
barred from social media and accessing content with extremist views.”).
283. See Montemayor, supra note 279. After one year on supervised release, a judge has
the option to reduce the amount of time, and/or the conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1);
see also supra Section II.A.iii.
284. See United States v. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d 194, 220–21 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 163, at 122–23 (“The [Danish] Back
on Track . . . programme was designed to help prisoners who have been charged or convicted
of terrorism-related offences, or who have been assessed as vulnerable to radicalization.”));
Berkell, supra note 17, at 28–32 (describing the deradicalization program used by Saudi
Arabia).
285. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 28 (explaining “[p]rominent examples include
disengagement initiatives known as Exit programs in Norway, Sweden, and Germany”).
286. See id. at 26.
287. See Sebastian Rotella, Europe’s Revolving-Door Prisons Compound Growing Terror
Threat,
PROPUBLICA
(June
23,
2015,
5:44
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/europes-revolving-door-prisons-compound-growing-terr
or-threat [https://perma.cc/K99Y-NL9W] (explaining terrorism sentences are short in Europe
compared to the United States).
288. See id.; Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1523.
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Nations other than the United States “have experienced more immediate
and extensive threats from young people joining extremist groups”; these
countries have utilized a holistic approach by implementing alternative to
incarceration programs centered on mental health, economic opportunities,
and family and religious counseling.289 Countries such as Germany,
Northern Ireland, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, the United Kingdom, and Malaysia
have implemented diversion programs for potentially radicalized
individuals.290 This diverse group of nations’ programs utilize rehabilitative
opportunities that can lead to lessened jail time.291
Many European countries have designed and used intensive
disengagement and deradicalization programs to assist people charged and
convicted of terrorism-related offenses. These programs have many
successes. One such success occurred in a Danish town where over 300
young people completed a deradicalization rehabilitation program — the
town went “from thirty [young people joining ISIS] in 2013 to only one the
following year.”292 Additionally, Germany’s Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees partners with NGOs, such as HAYAT,293 “to counter violent
Islamist extremism using a counseling approach.”294 Germany offers a
national hotline for radicalization counseling.295 The hotline accepts
anyone’s calls and directs them to HAYAT.296 HAYAT received
international acclaim for its individualized counseling for people “on a path
toward Jihadist-inspired violent extremism.”297
Furthermore, the NGO Reprieve created a “Life After Guantánamo”
program to help re-settle people who were detained at Guantánamo Bay and
released to countries that were not their home countries.298 The program
289. See Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1552.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 1552–53.
292. Id. at 1553.
293. Hayat is Turkish and Arabic for “Life.” See HAYAT-DEUTSCHLAND,
https://hayat-deutschland.de/english/ [https://perma.cc/63EA-754M]. “HAYAT . . . is the
first German counseling program for persons involved in radical Salafist groups or on the path
of a violent Jihadist radicalization, including those travelling to Syria and other combat zones.
Further, HAYAT is available to the relatives of a radicalized person as well.” Id.
294. Berkell, supra note 17, at 28 (“Many other programs warrant consideration, such as
the UK’s Channel initiative, the Danish model in Aarhus, and in North America, the newly
created Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence in Montreal, Canada.
Although the U.S. lacks comprehensive programs domestically, the American military
pursued deradicalization strategies through Task Force 134 for detainee operations in Iraq
under the leadership of Major General Douglas Stone.”).
295. See id. at 33.
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. See
Life
After
Guantánamo,
REPRIEVE U.S. (May 20, 2016),
https://reprieve.org/2016/05/20/life-after-guantanamo/ [https://perma.cc/33ES-28KE].
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aims to help former Guantánamo detainees receive services, support, and
counseling, including assistance with integration, family reunification,
housing, education, and employment.299 Reprieve arranged holistic services
“to 38 struggling ex-prisoners in 18 countries.”300 The U.S. government had
tortured all of the program participants.301 Thus, the holistic nature of the
program was vital to their rehabilitation.302 Without the Life After
Guantánamo program, these participants would likely “be abandoned,
stigmatized and lack access to services necessary to overcome a range of
psychological and physical illnesses.”303
Not all deradicalization programs are successful. For example, in May
2016, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls publicized “that France [would]
open a dozen de-radicalization centers.”304 This program closed after five
months.305 In the French program, participants “worked with teachers,
psychologists, and imams in a rural chateau in the Loire Valley to discuss
religion and jihadi ideologies.”306 However, halal food was not provided for
the participants, and “they studied French history, philosophy, and literature,
wore uniforms, and sang the national anthem.”307 Even the program’s Imam
was not allowed to keep a halal diet.308 New America researchers Elena
Sourin and Spandana Singh explain that the French deradicalization program
failed for two reasons. First, “although the center wanted to address the root
causes of radicalization and had psychologists on staff,” the program
over-emphasized “ideology by trying to replace extremism with a secular
‘counter-truth.’”309 Second, “the program promoted Western nationalist
identities over Islamic ones, an especially fraught move in France, given the
country’s long-standing tensions around laïcité, the legal principle that
promotes secularism in theory but, to many critics, seems more focused on
limiting Muslims’ ability to observe Islam.”310 These mistakes made
deradicalization unlikely. Ultimately the researchers suggested that a more

299. See id.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Berkell, supra note 17, at 28.
305. See Elena Souris & Spandana Singh, Want to Deradicalize Terrorists? Treat Them
(Nov.
23,
2018,
7:00
AM),
Like
Everyone
Else,
FOREIGN POL’Y
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/23/want-to-deradicalize-terrorists-treat-them-like-everyo
ne-else-counterterrorism-deradicalization-france-sri-lanka-pontourny-cve/
[https://perma.cc/KW5J-ZSN9].
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. Id.
310. Id.

238

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

holistic and therapeutic-focused program, where community organizations
directly work with participants, would more effectively help individuals
rehabilitate, as well as protect, their legal rights.311
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has extensive deradicalization programs and
has touted very low recidivism rates,312 with success rates of up to 87%.313
The Saudi program includes in-prison counseling and religious re-education,
in which 5,000 people participated.314 The program features several key
components: the “presumption of benevolence,” a halfway house-type
structure where mental health professionals and imams provide services, and
the practice of “respected Islamic scholars correct[ing] what they consider
warped interpretations of Islam.” 315
However, there have been significant failures within the program.316 Such
failures include that “310 to 390 graduates have ‘relapsed’ into
extremism.”317 In addition, the Saudi program includes aspects that would
not work in the United States, such as finding male defendants a wife and
buying them a car.318 Furthermore, the religious aspects of the “program
would not be culturally viable in the United States or legally [viable] under
the First Amendment.”319 Thus, the Saudi program likely is not replicable
in the United States due to religious and cultural differences, and because the
program is used for defendants convicted of all levels of terrorism — violent
and non-violent, significant and minor.
Overall, deradicalization programs’ “existence is evidence of a
commitment to dealing with the problem of radicalization by focusing on
rehabilitation.”320 A defendant can be sentenced to participate in such a
diversion program321 and a sentence could be lessened or eliminated, should
the participant successfully complete the program.

311. See id.
312. See Walters, supra note 2.
313. Associated Press, Saudi Arabia Sends Convicted Terrorists to a Cushy Rehab Center,
N.Y.
POST
(June
24,
2015),
https://nypost.com/2015/06/24/saudi-arabia-sends-convicted-terrorists-to-a-cushy-rehab-cen
ter/ [https://perma.cc/P6BB-K3QZ].
314. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 30.
315. Id.
316. See Walters, supra note 2.
317. Berkell, supra note 17, at 31 (citations omitted).
318. See Andreas Casptack, Deradicalization Programs in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study,
MIDDLE
E.
INST.
(June
10,
2015),
https://www.mei.edu/publications/deradicalization-programs-saudi-arabia-case-study
[https://perma.cc/QEF3-FFNK].
319. Berkell, supra note 17, at 31.
320. United States v. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d 194, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
321. See id. (citing Liesbeth van der Heide & Bart Schuurman, Reintegrating Terrorists in
the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch Approach, 17 J. DERADICALIZATION 196, 204–07
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C. Avoiding Pitfalls of Diversion Programs Generally and Countering
Violent Extremism Programs Specifically
i. Pitfalls of Diversion Programs
Diversion programs are far from perfect. As criminologist Darryl Davies
stated in 1976, “[d]iversion is part of what I call the ‘Bartholomew Effect in
Penology’; that is, in our eagerness to devise alternatives to imprisonment,
we may merely replace one method with another; creating more problems in
the process.”322 There are significant liberty interests at stake for a defendant
and an individual could easily consent to a diversion or alternative to
incarceration program without being fully aware of his loss of rights.323
Thus, a person charged with a crime may choose to participate in a program
without realizing he could have been acquitted of the charge in a criminal
court.324
These diversion program problems continue today. The Vera Institute of
Justice cautions, “[b]ecause these courts hold the promise of addressing
problems faced by many people who come into contact with the criminal
justice system, experts counsel that courts should partner with and follow the
guidance of those who are trained in clinically appropriate methods, to avoid
ordering inadequate or misapplied treatment.”325 Defendants should be
aware of each component of a diversion program and should not be forced
to participate without knowing the extensive pros and cons of their
selection.326 Diversion should not serve as the government forcing change
on an individual — the individual should be interested in changing
themselves and should not lose all autonomy in their say of how best to do
so.
Furthermore, another pitfall of any alternative to incarceration program is
fear of the “Willie Horton effect” — that program success is thwarted by
individual failures. Willie Horton was an incarcerated person who was

(2018)) (describing the Dutch Terrorism, Extremism, and Radicalization team, which was
designed to “(a) improve efforts made to reintegrate terrorist prisoners while still in detention,
(b) provide better aftercare upon their release, and (c) create a central and coordinated
approach for dealing with this offender class in the future”).
322. Darryl T. Davies, The Pitfalls of Diversion: Criticism of a Modern Development in an
Era on Penal Reform, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 759, 762 (1976).
323. See id. at 764.
324. See id.
325. What
Is
Diversion?,
VERA
INST.
JUSTICE
(June
21,
2016),
https://www.vera.org/the-human-toll-of-jail/judging-without-jail/what-is-diversion
[https://perma.cc/25N2-JTRS].
326. See generally Davies, supra note 322.
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granted permission to participate in a weekend-leave program.327 On one
such weekend, Horton “brutally raped a woman and assaulted her
boyfriend.”328 Professor John Pfaff explained that “Horton was an outlier
[because] more than 99% of those allowed to go home on leaves returned
without incident.”329 In 1988, during his successful run for president,
George Bush Senior utilized Horton’s case in an infamous attack ad that
some claimed won Bush the presidency.330 Pfaff stated that “[a]lthough the
impact of the ad on the outcome of the election has been overstated,
politicians quickly learned its lesson. No matter how successful an ‘early
release’ prison program is, one single failure can impose huge political
costs.”331 Potential individual failures, along with many programs’
shortcomings, illustrate how diversion programs are imperfect.
ii. Pitfalls of Countering Violent Extremism Programs
Countering violent extremism (CVE) is “a catchall term for terrorism
prevention strategies that critics say [can] stigmatize Muslims and yield few
or no measurable results.”332 In 2011, the Obama Administration released a
strategic implementation plan with the overarching goal of “preventing
violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing,
financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit
acts of violence.”333 CVE refers to four stages: prevention, intervention,
rehabilitation, and reintegration.334 Diversion is included in the latter two
categories, given that these categories take place after arrest.
Additionally, community policing, sometimes a CVE aspect, comes with
its own pitfalls. In Policing Terrorists in the Community, Sahar Aziz
explained critiques of community policing in counterterrorism, including
that individuals are divided into categories of “Good Muslims” or “Bad
Muslims” depending on their willingness to cooperate with the federal
government, and that Muslim community leaders are selected “to gather and

327. See John Pfaff, The Never-Ending ‘Willie Horton Effect’ Is Keeping Prisons Too Full
for
America’s
Good,
L.A.
TIMES
(May
14,
2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-pfaff-why-prison-reform-isnt-working-20170
514-story.html [https://perma.cc/6TUQ-G6M2].
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See id.
331. Id.
332. Hannah Allam, ‘We Were Blindsided’: Families of Extremists Form Group to Fight
Hate,
NPR
(Dec.
12,
2019,
12:10
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/12/12/787295283/we-were-blindsided-families-of-extremists-for
m-group-to-fight-hate [https://perma.cc/7A3G-7SDV].
333. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., supra note 243, at 1–2.
334. See Berkell, supra note 17, at 5–7.
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share seemingly innocuous information about their communities” that
ultimately may be used by law enforcement.335
Thus, some worry that CVE programs are used as a front for domestic
intelligence gathering.336 A group of human rights, civil liberties, and
community-based organizations wrote to Deputy National Security Advisor
Lisa Monaco expressing their concerns about the CVE programs.337 They
described the possible impact of the targeting of Muslim-American
communities and communities presumed to be Muslim, and broadly
addressed “religious exercise; freedom of expression; government
preference for or interference in religion; stigmatization of American
Muslims; and ongoing abusive surveillance and monitoring practices.”338
The groups recommended not to involve U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the FBI
in CVE programs given their lead involvement in investigations and
prosecutions.339
IV. AN SDNY-EDNY DIVERSION PROGRAM FOR YOUNG PEOPLE
CHARGED WITH MATERIAL SUPPORT
Part IV explains the feasibility of a joint SDNY-EDNY diversion program
for young people charged with material support. Section IV.A highlights
EDNY judges who have requested such a program be developed. Section
IV.B explains how the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New
York created its own deradicalization program merely a few years ago.
Section IV.C lays out the major considerations for an SDNY-EDNY
diversion program tailored for young people charged with material support.

335. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 147–
48 (2014).
336. See CAIR-MN: Civil Rights Groups Concerned About Minneapolis CVE Pilot
Program,
CISION
(Jan.
23,
2015,
10:27
AM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cair-mn-civil-rights-groups-concerned-about-m
inneapolis-cve-pilot-program-300024869.html [https://perma.cc/2LLR-N3U7].
337. See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., to Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant
to the President for Homeland Sec. & Deputy Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Off. of the Homeland Sec.
Advisor
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141218_cve_coalition_letter_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4LL-UPER].
338. Id.
339. See id. at 3–4 (“Justice Department Civil Rights Division Investigation & Assessment:
The Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department should investigate and assess the impact
of DOJ and FBI community outreach and CVE programs on religious exercise and freedom
of expression in minority communities, including American Muslim communities . . . .
Justice Department Guidance on Race: Our concerns outlined above are heightened by recent
changes to the Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.
The changes to do not close loopholes that have long permitted the use of profiling in the
national security context. In fact, the Guidance explicitly permits practices we have long
identified as abusive, discriminatory and stigmatizing.”).
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A. Judges Who Have Expressed A Need for Material Support
Diversion Programs
At least two EDNY judges have expressed the need for a diversion
program created specifically for young people charged with material support.
As discussed above in Section II.B.i, Judge Weinstein stated the importance
of material support diversion programs in United States v. Ceasar.340 Judge
Weinstein explicitly stated that a program should be created for defendants
like Ceasar:
In Europe, countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have designed
and used intensive disengagement and deradicalization programs to assist
prisoners charged and convicted of terrorism-related offenses. The United
States has no such program. The Bureau of Prisons should seriously
consider designing an appropriate program to deal with American terrorists
like this one. Without access to treatment while incarcerated or on
supervised release, Defendant will likely remain an unrehabilitated
supporter of ISIL and a continuing danger to the United States.341

Judge Weinstein made clear that diversion programs serve not only to help
the individual and reduce their incarceration time, but also to directly combat
radicalization. This is especially true given that material support defendants
are rarely, if ever, incapacitated for life.342
EDNY Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy presented similar thoughts in
United States v. Augustine.343 Bernard Augustine was charged with
attempting to provide material support to ISIS.344 Family turmoil roused
Augustine to leave his parents’ home.345 At 18 years old, he flew to
Tunisia,346 where he was arrested and sentenced to two years in a Tunisian
prison.347 After serving his sentence, the FBI collected him from Tunisia
and charged him with material support in the United States.348 Judge Levy
expressed the need for a diversion program during Augustine’s bond hearing:
There is no alternative to incarceration program for people who were young
who went to, you know, to join ISIS, at least not in this district. If there

340. 388 F. Supp. 3d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); see also supra Section II.B.i.
341. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 196.
342. See AMERICAN EXCEPTION, supra note 11, at 34; CASE BY CASE ISIS PROSECUTIONS,
supra note 11, at 21.
343. United States v. Augustine, No. 18-CR-00393 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 2018).
344. See Transcript of Bail Application at 5–6, United States v. Augustine, No.
18-CR-00393 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 24, 2019).
345. See id. at 3–4.
346. See id. at 4.
347. See id. at 5, 23–24.
348. See id. at 5–6. When he completed his sentence, Augustine was sent to Tunisian
immigration custody because he is a U.S. citizen. See id.
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were, that would be something that would be, I think, useful in a situation
like this. But we don’t have that. And the safeguards that would come with
that we don’t have.349

Here, Judge Levy exemplified a nearly identical point as Judge Weinstein:
an alternative to incarceration program is necessary to rehabilitate and
reintegrate defendants and also a more humane option than incarceration.
But no such program exists. Given these judges’ desires to see a diversion
program enacted, their interest and influence should be considered in helping
to ensure an effective program.
B. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York Created
a Deradicalization Program
In 2018 and before, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New
York created the Disruption and Early Engagement Program (DEEP).350
DEEP was devised as “a strategic public/private partnership aimed at
reducing the threat of terrorism by building a pool of subject matter experts
across disciplines.”351 A diverse range of players were involved, including
Assistant U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Defenders of New York, mental health
professionals, the Probation Department, Pretrial Services, and other
individuals focused on curtailing violent extremism.352
The program’s main advocate, former EDNY National Security &
Cybercrime Section Chief Seth DuCharme, touted DEEP during the 2018
ISIS prosecution of John Doe.353 Although DEEP never became an official
diversion program within the EDNY court, at least one EDNY defendant

349. Id. at 33.
350. BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., HOMELAND SEC. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CTR., PRACTICAL
TERRORISM
PREVENTION
45
n.28
(2019),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2600/RR2647/RAND_RR
2647.pdf [https://perma.cc/J95B-DKUT] (explaining how “[t]here appears to be little current
activity in the United States that is focused on diversion in lieu of prosecution for any
terrorism-related offenses, in contrast to some other types of crimes (according to multiple
interviews with government representatives at the federal and local levels, 2018). The one
possible exception is the Disruption and Early Engagement Program (DEEP) run by the U.S.
Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York”).
351. Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 51, United States v. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d
194 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 17-CR-00048).
352. See id. (explaining that if the client, Ms. Ceasar, were to have the opportunity to
participate in DEEP, she “looks forward to participating in this collaborative network, and
discussing her experiences in the hopes that public safety professional and partners could learn
from her personal path in this case”).
353. See
Seth
Ducharme,
STS.
ATT’Y
(July
21,
2020),
https://www.statesattorney.org/case/seth-d-ducharme/#:~:text=Seth%20DuCharme%20joine
d%20the%20United,States%20Attorney’s%20Office%20in%202015
[https://perma.cc/EX4B-KN35]. See generally United States v. Doe, 323 F. Supp. 3d 368
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).

244

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

participated in DEEP through a collaboration with the U.S. Attorney’s Office
and defense counsel. In one case, John Doe, a U.S. citizen, then
25-years-old, joined ISIS in Syria; for five months, “he served ISIS in an
administrative role.”354 Doe was “present in at least one battle, he received
military training, he carried firearms, and he was introduced to explosive
belts used to blow up civilians.”355 Doe cooperated with the government
and, through DEEP, he participated in terrorism prevention education and
helped prevent a juvenile from continuing on the path toward jihadism.356
The government’s own expert witness at Doe’s sentencing hearing, Deputy
Director of George Washington University’s Program on Extremism Seamus
Hughes, recommended requiring further counseling and mentoring support
for Doe post-sentence; Hughes also proposed offering “an ‘individualized
approach,’ creating a ‘cocoon’ around the defendant comprised of
community groups, law enforcement, religious leaders, and others.”357 Part
of the government’s interest in DEEP was its fear that Doe could be
“re-radicalized in prison.”358 For this reason, the government’s expert
“concluded that supervised release, rather than incarceration, would increase
[the] defendant’s chances to be rehabilitated.”359
Notably, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Fiscal Year 2021
budget request includes, “[i]n addition to traditional prosecution options,
[Department of Justice] is expanding implementation of its [DEEP] model,
which assesses the degree of threat posed by particular subjects and develops
options to mitigate the threat and divert or disrupt mobilization to
violence.”360 In July 2020, DuCharme was named the new Acting U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York.361 Political will is a necessity
for the implementation of any diversion program, let alone one for people
charged with crimes of terrorism. Given DuCharme’s previous interest in
DEEP and DHS’s possible financial commitment, there may now be the
political will from Acting U.S. Attorney DuCharme as the new EDNY head.

354. Doe, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 370.
355. Id. at 370.
356. See id. at 375.
357. Id. at 381.
358. See id. at 382.
359. Id.
360. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2021 BUDGET REQUEST (2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0210_dhs-tvtp-omb-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8H24-TJM7].
361. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Attorney General William
P. Barr Announces the Appointment of Seth D. DuCharme as Acting United States Attorney
for
the
Eastern
District
of
New
York
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-appointm
ent-seth-d-ducharme-acting-united [https://perma.cc/B6GE-PZPS].
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C. What an SDNY-EDNY Diversion Program Could Look Like
Keeping the pitfalls discussed in Section A.ii in mind, it is important to
consider the many positive aspects of a material support diversion program.
Given the government’s appetite for charging young people with material
support, along with “the preemptive nature of the prohibitions,” an
alternative to incarceration program for young people charged with material
support is imperative.362
EDNY and SDNY are uniquely situated to offer an alternative to
incarceration program for young people charged or convicted of material
support. Nearly one-fifth of all ISIS-related charges are brought in SDNY
or EDNY.363 Logistically, the two districts already offer three alternative to
incarceration programs for young defendants.364 These programs are offered
as both an alternative to incarceration and as a re-entry tool to limit
recidivism.365 EDNY in particular is uniquely positioned to host diversion
programs given its previous implementation of DEEP and its history as one
of the first federal districts to offer alternative to incarceration options in as
early as 2000.366 In the case of material support-connected programs, EDNY
could further lead. Because EDNY and SDNY pre-trial officers are already
actively involved with managing diversion programs, these officers are
prepared, and even eager, to contribute to reducing the federal prison
population, especially for young defendants.367 As discussed in Section
III.C.ii, a coalition of human rights, civil liberties, and Muslim-American
community-based organizations recommend that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
and the FBI not be connected with CVE programs given their lead
involvement in investigations and prosecutions.368
Community
organizations, probation officers, and judges are better situated to oversee
these programs given they are certainly more neutral than the U.S.
Attorney’s Office.
This Note, drawing on these themes, other nations’ deradicalization
efforts, and the Minnesota program’s success, expands upon those ideas to

362. Berkell, supra note 17, at 22 (citing Seamus Hughes, Domestic Counterterrorism:
Material Support or Bust, LAWFARE (Aug. 30, 2015, 10:03 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/domestic-counterterrorism-material-support-or-bust
[https://perma.cc/CY82-ACV2]).
363. See ISIS in America, supra note 25.
364. See generally Wolff et al., supra note 102.
365. See id. at 6, 9–11.
366. See U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY, E. DIST. OF N.Y., supra note 109, at 7; U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION COURT PROGRAMS 31 (2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2017/20170928_alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTK6-TUA8].
367. See Wolff et al., supra note 102, at 11.
368. See supra Section III.C.ii.
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explain how re-pluralization, choice, the role of family and community, and
the ability to make some mistakes are also key matters to consider when
devising a diversion program for people charged with material support.
Below are general pillars for a material support alternative to incarceration
program that considers the pitfalls of diversion programs generally and CVE
programs specifically.
i. Re-Pluralization
Re-pluralization is the careful reintroduction of problems and solutions
into a radicalized person’s life, so that they actively choose to stop their
dichotomous, overly suspicious thinking.369 Re-pluralization “encourages
reflection about whether a certain course of action is absolutely necessary,
providing room for further intervention.”370 In other words, radicalization is
de-pluralization — “only recogniz[ing] problems, solutions and future
scenarios associated with a specific ideology and not perceive[ing]
alternative frames and interpretations of core political values.”371 Coiner
Daniel Koehler further explains that if one’s de-pluralization is “based on
devaluing other humans,” the radicalization process then leads to “use of
violence as the only perceived feasible option to solve that psychological
tension.”372 Thus, re-pluralization is centered on learning problem-solving
skills that, as Koehler explains, “relieves the tension between the ideological
urgency to act and the lack of alternative solutions.”373 Understanding that
life is not binary is an important first step; the second step is then channeling
energy into activities that fit with a participant’s new mindset. Koehler
traveled to Minneapolis to train probation officers who would work with
Yusuf in the re-pluralization-focused program.374 Koehler trained officers
with lessons designed to assist with counseling people experiencing
extremist thinking.375 For example, in one exercise, Koehler showed a
hypothetical teen’s Facebook history, which indicated the hypothetical
young person was “in the midst of being radicalized by the Islamic State.”376
The social media history included a range of topics — everything from

369. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
370. Koehler, supra note 22.
371. Id.
372. Sara Brzuszkiewicz, An Interview with Daniel Koehler, German Institute on
Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies, EUR. EYE ON RADICALIZATION (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://eeradicalization.com/an-interview-with-daniel-koehler-german-institute-on-radicaliza
tion-and-de-radicalization-studies/ [https://perma.cc/E4GB-BUKY].
373. Koehler, supra note 22.
374. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
375. See id.
376. Id.
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“anguished posts about his fictional father’s disapproval of his new lifestyle”
to “comments on videos about the jihadis.”377 The officers were supposed
to notice that several of the posts featured images related to photography —
for example, one photograph, captioned “Jihad Is Beautiful,” presented a
group of Islamic State soldiers looking at the screen of a digital camera.378
Koehler’s point was to illustrate the teen had once dreamed of becoming a
photojournalist and that his re-pluralization should therefore include this
passion for photography.379
Participants in re-pluralization education learn to understand why they
were driven to extremist views and develop appropriate problem-solving
skills. For example, a program participant could learn through analysis of
the push-pull factors. Daisy Khan is the Executive Director of the Women’s
Islamic Initiative in Spirituality and Equality and the editor of WiseUp:
Knowledge Ends Extremism, a book representing “a community-led effort to
address the issue of the rise of extremism, wherever it might be, but, also, to
prevent the rise of Islamophobia in this country.”380 Khan refers to push-pull
factors as those that draw someone toward an FTO (the push: kindness from
ISIS online community members) and those that draw someone away from
western society (the pull: having one’s hijab pulled off while walking to
school).381 Khan is clear that many people drawn to ISIS are not motivated
by the extremist ideology, but actually social isolation, trauma, and yearning
for a life purpose.382 Extremist groups’ effective manipulation allows
disaffected young people to feel connected to a broader community and
purpose.383 Part of re-pluralization is first understanding the various
push-pull factors in one’s life and then choosing to change behavior
accordingly. The participant will begin to re-pluralize when he more fully
understands the root cause of his interest in extremist ideologies and then
recognizes that the singular organization cannot solve his problems. By

377. Id.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. United States v. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d 194, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). Khan’s book
WiseUp also compiled common misconceptions about American Muslims, including that,
“according to Gallup, American Muslims are more likely than any other religious community
to reject violence against civilians.” Habib Todd Boerger, Book Review, SPIRITUALITY &
PRAC. 1 (reviewing DAISY KHAN, WISEUP: KNOWLEDGE ENDS EXTREMISM (2017)),
https://www.Spirituality&Practice.Com/Book-Reviews/View/28866/Wiseup
[https://perma.cc/M7NL-R2YD] (last visited Aug. 11, 2020). The book also “explores the
emergence of violent extremism and its consequences, clarifying that more than 80 percent of
victims are Muslim and that the majority of such incidents occur in majority-Muslim
countries.” Id.
381. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 212–13.
382. See id. at 212.
383. See supra Section II.B.

248

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

understanding the root cause of problems, individuals can then begin to see
life in nuanced shades of gray, actively choosing to abandon their
de-pluralized, binary thoughts and actions.
ii. Choice
Many of diversion programs’ pitfalls stem from a lack of choice and
therefore a lack of autonomy.384 For example, although the Minneapolis
program provided Yusuf the choice, and ultimately the opportunity, to
participate, Judge Davis did not permit other defendants to participate after
a one-time set date.385 If a person is to change, they must be ready to take
an active role in their life. Choice about education, programs, activities, or
employment is a key aspect in allowing participants to begin to exercise
autonomy over their own lives. For example, the Minneapolis program gave
Yusuf options from which he could choose.386 Some small: which books to
read and review with his mentor.387 And some more significant: whether to
cease association with other suspects, who were friends.388 By actively
making choices for oneself, the program participant takes action steps to
re-pluralize.
Choice is further discussed below as related to the role of family and
community.
iii. The Role of Family and Community
Koehler believes that to be successful in re-pluralization, one must have
stable and supportive relationships throughout rehabilitation.389 This entails
including community-based organizations, as opposed to merely probation
officers, in the rehabilitation process. Koehler further explained that family
therapy, if available, is key to ideological rehabilitation.390 Koehler
recommends groups not connected with the government, including Families
for Life, which was founded by Nicola Benyahia after her son joined ISIS
and died fighting on their behalf.391 These groups are more likely to
positively impact people charged with material support because their staff
and volunteers can speak with personal knowledge about the program
participants’ experiences. This personal knowledge, that a probation officer

384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See supra Section III.C.i.
See Walters, supra note 2.
See supra Section III.A.ii.
See supra Section III.A.ii.
See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1; McEnroe, supra note 270.
See Martin, supra note 3.
See Walters, supra note 2.
See id.
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would likely not have, helps to create stronger bonds, which are needed for
personal emotional growth.
Another element of choice is the inclusion of one’s family, or other
support sources, in the rehabilitation process. Family, or other community
support, is crucial in ensuring that changes made while in the program
continue after the individual returns home. One example is the group Parents
for Peace.392 The group originally started as a support group for family,
friends, and individuals who are former extremists or the relative of a former
extremist.393 Parents for Peace aims “to reframe extremism as a public health
emergency” and “to put human faces to a problem typically addressed as a
national security issue.”394 Members include the wife of a former Klansman,
a man who identifies as a former neo-Nazi, and the aunt of a young man who
died in Somalia while attempting to join ISIS.395 The group’s most
well-known member is self-described “former Islamic jihadist” Tania Joya,
whose ex-husband is Yahya al-Bahrumi, former highest-ranking American
ISIS Commander.396 The key aspects of Parents for Peace include “a
no-judgment zone,” allowing members from all different radicalized
backgrounds397 to participate with the goal “to set aside partisan differences
and present a unified front against extremism.”398 This no-judgement zone
allows for an individual to participate in the community, even while still
wavering on deciding to deradicalize or not.399 Mixed-ideology groups
allow participants to focus on life decisions and root causes, as opposed to
shared ideology. The no-judgment zone allows different extremist group
members to realize the commonalities of said groups — preying on
vulnerable youth, manipulation via social media, intense sense of
community, and the requirement of extreme thought to participate in severe

392. See generally About Us, PARENTS FOR PEACE, https://www.parents4peace.org
[https://perma.cc/KQ3Q-S4K6] (last visited Aug. 8, 2020).
393. See Allam, supra note 332.
394. Id.
395. See id.
396. See Cyril Julien, Ex-Jihadist Tania Joya Now Fights to ‘Reprogram’ Extremists,
YAHOO!
NEWS
(July
19,
2019),
https://news.yahoo.com/ex-jihadist-tania-joya-now-fights-reprogram-extremists-030911737.
Html [https://perma.cc/B449-MMDD].
397. See Allam, supra note 332 (explaining how “[a]t the summit, a Somali Muslim with
henna patterns on her hands sat next to an ex-skinhead with tattoos across his knuckles. They
have political and religious differences; sometimes they squabble like family members”).
398. Id. (including the Executive Director declaring “[w]e know that we vote differently
from one another . . . . I love all of you members that are conservative and that are liberal and
independent or you don’t care. We are on the same page”).
399. See id.
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actions.400 As one Parents for Peace member explained, “[l]eaving was like
kicking an addiction. ‘When you’re coming off of hate and extremism, it’s
the same process . . . . You’ve got to have a support group. You’ve got to
have a network.’”401 In order for participants to share common ground about
the ways various extremist ideologies are similarly unhealthy, the
SDNY-EDNY program should include members of different ideological
backgrounds. Otherwise, participants may be too enmeshed in their own
thinking and ideology. Groups like Parents for Peace should be considered
for contracts.
Another crucial aspect is the want to change — even if the desire to change
comes from a loved one and not from the individual extremist-thinker
himself.402 Inspiration from family members or other loved ones is critical
for change to actually occur.403 Because not all material support defendants
are charged in jurisdictions they call home or where they have community,
the opportunity to participate in a program based in another jurisdiction is
also key.
iv. Opportunity to “Fail” Without Drastic Repercussions
Young people will make mistakes. And as one Parents for Peace member
shared, “[l]eaving was like kicking an addiction.”404 In a similar vein,
Koehler explained that because extremist radicalization promises that
believers “will immediately start to change society and live out their ideals,
. . . newly minted extremists often experience feelings of euphoria, much like
addicts who’ve just discovered the drug that will be their doom.”405 As
clinical psychologist Katherine Porterfield explained at Ceasar’s sentencing

400. See id. This approach is especially key given DOJ just started prosecuting members
of MS-13 with material support. See generally Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the E. Dist.
of Va., MS-13 Leader in El Salvador Charged with RICO & Terrorism Offenses (July 15,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/Ms-13-Leader-El-Salvador-Charged-Rico-&-Terroris
m-Offenses [https://perma.cc/X2C2-BQ5M]. There are many shared characteristics of
individuals who make up the general recruitment base and membership ranks of ISIS and
MS-13, including ideological similarities and why certain aspects of ideology appeal to those
groups. See generally Robert Alvarez, On Gangsters & ISIS Militants: Contemporary
Manifestations of Marginalization & Anomie, HUMAN. ACTION (Oct. 2016),
https://www.Humanityinaction.Org/Knowledge_Detail/On-Gangsters-&-Isis-Militants-Cont
emporary-Manifestations-Of-Marginalization-&-Anomie/ [https://perma.cc/K2UT-8NEZ].
401. Allam, supra note 332 (quoting Chris Buckley, a former Ku Klux Klan member).
402. See id.
403. See id. (explaining “[h]e is here because his wife, Melissa, decided in 2016 that she
was tired of the toxic world of the KKK. She could no longer watch her 4-year-old son do the
‘white power’ salute to be like his dad. ‘I went into Google and I typed in: “How do you get
your spouse or loved one out of a hate group?”’”).
404. Allam, supra note 332.
405. Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
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hearing, just as alcoholics or those addicted to drugs can relapse, individuals
struggling with extremist beliefs can also relapse.406 Relapses occur because
the trajectory of progress rarely goes in “a straight line.”407 Porterfield
explained that although relapses often lead to negative collateral
consequences, sometimes relapses produce positive impacts for those in
therapy;408 a relapse gives a therapist and client the “meat” to work together
to analyze the choices that led to the relapse.409 Whether a person relapses
by using drugs after staying sober, returning to an abusive partner, or
re-connecting with members of an FTO, there is room for growth, and deeper
understanding of one’s root problems, post-relapse.410 A relapse for a
material support defendant does not necessarily mean a violent act. For
example, in Yusuf’s early days living in a halfway house after his arrest, he
“relapsed” by hoarding a box cutter under his bed — a clear violation of
halfway-house protocols.411 Additionally, while out on bond, Ceasar
re-connected with the online ISIS community.412 Both situations involved
young people, Ceasar, then 23, and Yusuf, then 19, committing serious
violations of their supervised release requirements.413 Either situation could
have warranted a judge deciding that the person was not worthy of further
chances, but in both cases, the judges deemed each defendant still worthy of
a second, or even third, chance.414 Program officials should expect that,
similar to a relapse, some mistakes will happen and that each participant
should receive the opportunity for an individualized hearing to determine
their ongoing suitability for the program.
These four categories — re-pluralization, choice, family and community,
and the opportunity to fail without drastic repercussions — are some of the
necessary considerations for creating an SDNY-EDNY alternative to
incarceration program for young people charged with material support.
Alternatives to incarceration are needed not only because young people
deserve the opportunity to grow but also because it is in the nation’s best
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

See United States v. Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d 194, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
Id.
See id. at 216.
See id.
See id. at 215–16.
See Katie Zavadski, Group with No Jihadi Experience Rehabs ISIS Recruit, DAILY
BEAST
(Apr.
14,
2017,
9:50
AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/group-with-no-jihadi-experience-rehabs-isis-recruit
[https://perma.cc/PB3S-7RPF] (explaining “the halfway house’s inspection of Yusuf’s room
turned up a box cutter, which got him kicked out of the home — but not out of rehab”).
412. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 203.
413. See id.; Zavadski, supra note 411.
414. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 220; Zavadski, supra note 411. Ceasar could have
received up to 50 years in prison. See Ceasar, 388 F. Supp. 3d at 223. Yusuf could have
received up to 15 years. See Koerner, Can You Turn a Terrorist, supra note 1.
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national security interest. First-time radicalization, as well as deepening
radicalization, can occur in prison.415 Other nations have more robust
deradicalization programs because they recognize prison time greatly
impacts their national security.416 Additionally, monetary costs are
comparable for imprisonment or diversion programs.417 And the science is
clear — human brains develop up until the mid to late twenties.418 Young
people’s brains are undeveloped and, therefore, more open to change; young
people have reduced culpability because they are naturally predisposed to
impulsive decision making and negative peer influence.419 Furthermore,
when material support defendants are not incarcerated, they are still heavily
surveilled on supervised release.420 The intensity of supervised release is
mitigated by the fact there has been very little recidivism of those convicted
of crimes of terror since September 11.421 It is best for the broader
community if the defendant has an opportunity to deradicalize.
There is the possibility of a Willie Horton effect. If the Willie Horton
effect occurred for rape and assault,422 it would occur if terrorist activity
originated from someone who completed a diversion program. It is
important to consider that almost all people convicted of material support
will eventually be released, whether that is after incapacitation, a diversion
program, or some combination of both. Unfortunately, further terror activity
can never be permanently ruled out. This Note proposes it is more ethical
and effective to strive, and possibly fail, to rehabilitate the young material
support defendant as opposed to allowing them to possibly further radicalize
in prison.423
CONCLUSION
The material support statutes have great breadth. And with great breadth
should come extremely individualized decisions so that no one person is
incapacitated for longer than necessary. Given the extensive literature and
common understanding that young people deserve different opportunities
from our criminal legal system, there should be more rehabilitation and
reintegration opportunities for young people charged with material support.

415. See supra Section II.A.ii.
416. See supra Section III.A.i.
417. See supra Section I.D.
418. See supra Section II.B.
419. See supra Section II.B.
420. See supra Section II.A.iii.
421. See Hodwitz, supra note 183, at 54.
422. See Pfaff, supra note 327.
423. This is even more true given that material support defendants’ actions rarely lead to
any identifiable harm or imminent risk of harm. See Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1530.
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Furthermore, it is in the nation’s public safety interests to focus on
rehabilitation given the majority of material support defendants are young
Americans who will return home after incarceration. Rehabilitation is a
necessity given the alarming data about radicalization in prison. No matter
where on the radicalization spectrum, it is best for the broader community if
the defendant has an opportunity to deradicalize.
One of the first steps in combatting radicalization should be providing
smarter, more effective opportunities to re-pluralize those who are, or could
be, radicalized. EDNY and SDNY should expand upon the work of the
District of Minnesota and create their own diversion program for young
people charged with material support. With a robust pre-trial services team
knowledgeable about alternatives to incarceration programming and nearly
one-fifth of all ISIS-related cases charged in EDNY and SDNY, these two
districts could serve as the nation’s leader in brave, necessary, and
compassionate rehabilitation. A tailored diversion program for young
people charged with material support will combat excessively harsh
sentences and do more to prevent terror than incapacitation.
There is no question that ISIS’s power is dwindling.424 Many say the
caliphate is dead.425 But, alternatives to incarceration for those charged with
material support remain important. Extremist groups are not going
anywhere. In fact, the Trump Administration recently declared MS-13 an
FTO, and would like to declare Antifa one, thereby expanding FTOs to
include unorthodox, previously-unthinkable organizations.426 With DOJ’s
latest decision to charge alleged MS-13 members with material support and
President Trump’s promise to “designate [A]ntifa a terrorist
organization,”427 the need for material support diversion programs endures.

424. See generally Haroro J. Ingram & Asaad Almohammad, Caliph Dead, Caliphate
Destroyed, New Era Begins: Legacy, Leadership, & the Global Jihad, GEO. WASH. PROGRAM
EXTREMISM,
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Ingram%20%26%20almohamed%20p
oe%20blog%20post%202-_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J66J-746S].
425. See generally id.
426. See Allam, supra note 332; see also Ken Klippenstein, Homeland Security Is Quietly
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to
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Powers,
NATION
(Aug.
3,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/dhs-antifa-syria
[https://perma.cc/NWD8-SDWR].
427. Klippenstein, supra note 426 (explaining how a former senior DHS intelligence
officer said “[t]hey targeted Americans like they’re Al Qaeda.” The officer, who served for
years in the DHS’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), “compared the operations to the
illegal surveillance of activists during the civil rights era. They essentially were violating
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had to address.” He further explained that “[d]esignating someone as foreign-sponsored can
make a huge legal and practical difference in the government’s ability to pursue them”).

